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Constitutionality of Torture in a  
Ticking-Bomb Scenario: History,  
Compelling Governmental  







Adopted in 1791, the Eighth Amendment provides: 
―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖1 Is 
torture a cruel and unusual punishment?  How about torture in 
a ticking-bomb scenario where the pain of one man or woman 
might mean saving the life of many others?  The 
constitutionality of torture is a complex question.  It cannot be 
resolved with platitudes.  Indeed, the platitudes that do exist in 
the form of legal prescription are often conflicting.  Consider, 
for instance, the obvious conflict caused when these two 
commands, read in isolation, are taken to their logical 
extremes: self-preservation by any means and ensuring the 
human rights and dignity of all, irrespective of exigencies.  
Deciding whether the use of torture to ascertain secretive and 
potentially time-sensitive, disaster-avoiding information from 
an interrogated in a ticking-bomb scenario is constitutionally 
justified poses such a tension.  Whether torture is actually 
revelatory is a question of substantial debate. 
 
* Doctoral student, University of Cambridge.  The author is a former 
research assistant to Neal K. Katyal, counsel to the petitioner in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and in Engquist v. Oregon Department of 
Agriculture, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008), and now Principal Deputy Solicitor 
General at the United States Department of Justice.  He expresses his 
gratitude to Nandita Dasgupta, Utpal Dasgupta, Mark Stadnyk, Tom Grant, 
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Dasgupta can be reached at rd2136@columbia.edu. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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American federal law enactments as well as international 
human rights conventions have outlawed the use of torture 
(even though procedural loopholes remain alive).2  Prevailing 
military expert consensus attributes inefficacy to the use of 
torture.  Revered American political literature harkening back 
to the Enlightenment tradition, represented by Jean Jacques 
Rousseau,3 John Adams,4 and the Preamble to the American 
Constitution5 all disavow retribution, both public and private, 
 
2. See, e.g., Eric Engle, The Alien Tort Statute and The Torture Victims' 
Protection Act: Jurisdictional Foundations and Procedural Obstacles, 14 
WILLAMETTE J. INT‘L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2006) (―Though the United States 
is perceived as a chronic ‗non-joiner‘ of international human rights treaties, 
several U.S. laws permit individual citizens and aliens to prosecute overseas 
human rights violations in U.S. courts.  Examples include the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), the Torture Victims' Protection Act (TVPA), the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO), the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act (or 'Helms-Burton Act').  Procedurally, however, the 
viability of such claims is tempered by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 
(FSIA) and the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 
both of which limit the availability of substantive remedies when the 
defendant is a state actor.‖ (internal footnotes omitted)).  Altogether, the 
federal law provisions outlawing many forms of coercive interrogation are 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2340(1), 2340A, 3261–3267 (2000); 10 U.S.C. §§ 893, 918, 919, 924, 
928, 933. 
3. See, e.g, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (1762) (―The passage from the state of nature 
to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change, by substituting 
in his conduct justice for instinct, and by giving his actions the moral quality 
that they previously lacked.  It is only when the voice of duty succeeds 
physical impulse, and law succeeds appetite, that man, who till then had 
regarded only himself, sees that he is obliged to act on other principles, and 
to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations.‖). 
4. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, ON PRIVATE REVENGE (1763) (―For the great 
distinction between savage nations and polite ones, lies in this, — that among 
the former every individual is his own judge and his own executioner; but 
among the latter all pretensions to judgment and punishment are resigned to 
tribunals erected by the public; a resignation which savages are not, without 
infinite difficulty, persuaded to make, as it is of a right and privilege 
extremely dear and tender to an uncultivated nature.‖).  Adams‘s analysis 
impliedly draws a contrast between the famed classical virtues, ―Justice, 
Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance,‖ and the less desirable vices of certain 
officialdoms, ―savage state, courage, hardiness, activity, and strength.‖ 
5. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (―We the People of the United States, in Order to 
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish 
this Constitution for the United States of America.‖).  The Preamble denotes 
the aims of the Republic, and signals, as eloquently and meaningfully as any 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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as a reason underlying official conduct, and instead, counsel a 
deliberative approach.  That constitutional deliberation did not 
occur in the now-famous ―Bybee memo‖—an advisory opinion 
issued by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee in the 
Office of Legal Counsel in President George W. Bush‘s 
administration.6  While the Bybee memo carefully discusses the 
statutory and treaty implications of torture, its constitutional 
analysis has little to do with individual liberties, specifically 
regarding the Eighth Amendment.7  Instead, the discussion 
centers almost completely on the President‘s commander-in-
chief powers authorized by Article II of the Constitution.  In 
fact, the Bybee memo makes a passing reference to the ―rather 
limitless reach‖ of the Eighth Amendment‘s ban against cruel 
and unusual punishment: it states that court decisions have 
―engage[d] in detailed regulation of prison conditions.‖8  More 
conversation is needed on the subject.9 
These prescriptions ask, rather than answer, several 
questions.  Are water-boarding and other forms of torture 
constitutional when imposed by a sovereign State (specifically 
the National Security Agency (NSA) or the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)) confronted with imminent threats against its 
national security interest?  Is there a constitutional distinction 
with respect to interrogated citizens versus non-citizens, 
particularly with regard to extraordinary rendition?10  Has the 
 
document can, the coexistence and actuation of these ideals. 
6. Letter from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. 




8. Id. at 18 n.9. 
9. Other scholars and academics have been harsher in their treatment of 
the Bybee memo.  See, e.g., M. Katherine B. Darmer, Waterboarding and the 
Legacy of the Bybee-Yoo “Torture-Power” Memorandum: Reflections from a 
Temporary Yoo Colleague and Erstwhile Bush Administration Apologist, 12 
CHAP. L. REV. 639 (2009); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in 
the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1231 & n.182 (2006) (―In the 
two years since it was leaked to the public, the . . . [memo] has been withered 
by criticism for the poor quality of its legal analysis.‖ (referencing statement 
by former Yale Law School Dean Harold H. Koh, claiming it was ―perhaps the 
most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read‖)); Jeremy Waldron, 
Torture and Positive Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1703-09 (2005) (quality 
of memo ―is a disgrace‖). 
10. See Owen Fiss, Restoring the Full Rule of Law to America: Indemnify 
Torture Victims — A Commentary, THE DAILY STAR, July 7, 2009, http:// 
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United States Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny test to 
analogous situations, such as the cases of tortured or abused 
prisoners in the United States‘ federal and state prisons?  How 
can we best analyze the compelling governmental interests in 
support of torture in ticking-bomb scenarios?  What are the far-
reaching national security implications of these questions?  
And finally, what relevance do the experiences of terrorism-
fraught nations such as Israel have for American constitutional 
adjudication?  This Article cannot answer all these questions in 
sufficient depth, but, through the use of history, it does answer 
the fundamental ones.11 
Part I explains why the Supreme Court‘s decisions support 
the argument that torture is in most situations forbidden by 
the Eighth Amendment.  The prevailing constructions can be 
found in the Court‘s Hudson v. McMillian,12 Brown v. 
Mississippi,13 and Miranda v. Arizona14 lines of decisions.  
There is a bifurcation between preventive detention torture 
and punishment torture, and the merits and disadvantages of 
both are explained here.  Many objective deductions and some 
subjective value-judgments inform the inquiry. 
In Part II, this Article explores the constitutionality of 
torture in time-sensitive, ―clear and present danger‖15 scenarios 
 
www.law.yale.edu/news/9844.htm (defining extraordinary rendition as ―the 
transportation of individuals suspected of terrorist activity to foreign 
countries for interrogation, sometimes torture‖ (referencing Arar v. Ashcroft, 
532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008))); Matteo M. Winkler, When „Extraordinary‟ 
Means Illegal: International Law and the European Reactions to the United 
States Rendition Program (Yale Law School Student Scholarship Series, 
2007), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/46/. 
11. This exercise is intended to highlight the advantages and limitations 
of history as much as it is to answer the questions themselves. 
12. 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (holding that excessive force against a prisoner 
may constitute a cruel and unusual punishment). 
13. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that confessions exacted by torture and 
police violence violate due process and may not be admitted into trial as 
evidence). 
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that defendant must be informed of her 
right to an attorney and her privilege against self-incrimination both before 
and during questioning by police; otherwise, inculpatory and exculpatory 
statements gained from such questioning is inadmissible). 
15. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (―The question in 
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a 
question of proximity and degree.  When a nation is at war, many things that 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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by using the following historical instruments: the English Bill 
of Rights, the Virginia and Massachusetts convention debates, 
and the somewhat enlightening exchanges between delegates 
at the First Congress, which adopted the Eighth Amendment.  
The Eighth Amendment was inspired by the English Bill of 
Rights, the Northwest Ordinance, Virginia‘s Constitution of 
1776, and the Constitutions of seven other States.  These 17th 
and 18th century documents, read collectively, express a 
limited view on imminent danger situations.  However, their 
condemnation against torture per se is beyond dispute.  I reject 
as unprecedented and injudicious the possibility of 
―retrenching‖ the pro-individual interpretation of the Founding 
era. 
Part III explores the prospect of torture warrants, as 
explained articulately by Professor Alan Dershowitz.16  Despite 
federal law having outlawed torture by government officials, 
the debate is not academic or moot.  The ―rhetorical‖ ban on 
torture frequently is violated with impunity, thus incentivizing 
the legal community to devise a better framework that respects 
societal interests and human dignity—transparently.  Torture 
 
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their 
utterance will not be endured . . . .‖).  May other exigencies, apart from 
restricted speech, also be justified under the threat of a ―clear and present 
danger‖?  The conflict between national security and civil liberties was 
brought to a great height during World War I and the espionage cases, such 
as Schenck and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), but that 
conflict has an ancient pedigree that goes all the way back to the Founding 
generation.  See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at xxvii 
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1973) (―[P]erhaps it is a universal truth that the 
loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or 
pretended, from abroad.‖ (quoting James Madison)).  The debate, then and 
now, continues.  See generally Norman Dorsen, Rights — Here and There: 
Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT‘L L. 840 (1989); George P. 
Fletcher, War and the Constitution, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, available at 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=war_and_the_constitution 
(attending to ―the fundamental question of whether the Constitution . . . is 
different in wartime versus peacetime‖ and observing that ―[t]he fact of 
‗wartime‘ does not change the meaning or scope of due process — either 
linguistically or historically‖); Brief of Petitioner at 71, New York Times Co. 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (No. 1873), 1971 WL 147018 (noting 
that the United States' ―experience with censorship of political speech is 
happily almost non-existent.  Through wars and other turbulence, we have 
avoided it.  Given the choice of risks, we have chosen to risk freedom, as the 
First Amendment enjoins us to do‖). 
16. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002). 
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warrants, the argument goes, reduce the incidents of torture by 
dwindling both the number and severity of incidents to their 
absolute minimums.  The test for whether a torture warrant 
should be authorized must be based on criteria grounded in the 
Supreme Court‘s qualified immunity jurisprudence, stemming 
from its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics17.  Although Bivens has been 
eroded through procedural vehicles, such as pleading 
standards,  I argue that provided those errors are rectified, the 
Bivens standard, viewed in light of qualified immunity, 
provides a valuable test for courts to employ when evaluating 
the constitutionality of torture warrants.  Because half a loaf is 
better than no loaf at all, precluding torture in some grossly 
unwarranted cases through torture warrants should be seen as 
superior to blameless torture victims being deprived of the 
chance to recover all relief after the fact.  The issue of torture‘s 
constitutionality may well turn on evolving statutory and 
common law procedures rather than substantive constitutional 
law animating the Framers and the Republic‘s Enlightenment 
origins.  In many ways, this entire Article and the mapping of 
torture‘s possibilities and constitutionality in the United States 
is really a tale of procedure.  That is the carrefour where most 
real-life cases are decided. 
Part IV identifies the need to engage in further debate.  
This Article is agnostic about whether torture, under specific 
situations, should be permissible as a matter of policy or even 
whether it comports with the Constitution.  It presents 
arguments and uncertainties from both sides of the spectrum. 
 
I. Precedents for Torture as Punishment and as Preventive 
Interrogation 
 
A. The Humanity Question 
 
Torture in a ticking-bomb scenario is deontologically 
challenging.  Not only are there legitimate ethical and logical 
questions for circumstances where torture is imposed, there 
remain important constitutional and philosophical questions 
where the government actually forgoes torture.  Even when the 
 
17. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
550 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
government chooses not to commit torture in an extremely 
time-sensitive situation, it will be hard to know (with any 
reasonable certitude) the actual factors that stopped the attack 
in that instance.  The ticking-bomb scenario is context-specific, 
given the probabilities of an attack and of the torturee18 
possessing the requisite information to stop the attack.  The 
tipping point between seemingly incompatible ―values and 
principles is not fixed.  It differs from case to case and from 
issue to issue.  The damage to national security caused by a 
given terrorist and the [N]ation‘s response to the act affects the 
way in which the freedom and dignity of the individual is 
protected.‖19  In such times of panic, it is important to keep in 
mind that it ―is not that law is suspended in times of 
emergency . . . The point rather is that law is flexible enough to 
allow judges to give controlling weight to the immediate 
consequences of decision if those consequences are sufficiently 
grave.‖20  Because of this vast room for judicial discretion, 
though, principles and consistency are ever more important so 
as to preclude judges from indulging their personal policy 
preferences at the cost of neutrality.21 
Other issues informing the investigation are the amount of 
torture imposed (and the methods which are categorically 
impermissible), whether innocent lives can be saved without 
performing torture, and the use of torture in non-terrorist 
 
18. At times, this Article will use the term ―torturee‖ to refer to 
prospective torturees and those who have already been tortured and are 
seeking post-torture relief through federal constitutional and statutory 
means. 
19. OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: 
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 73 (2006) (quoting Aharon 
Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, and the Fight Against 
Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125, 135 (2003)). 
20. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 294 (2003). 
21. There remains much scholarly disputation regarding the ability of 
courts to serve as a forum where national security cases are litigated.  The 
consensus seems to be that courts may not monopolize the discourse but must 
add a strong voice to ensure a balance between individual liberties and 
government interests.  See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722-30 (3d ed. 2000); Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1359, 1375 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Keith E. 
Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objects and 
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002). 
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situations (counseled to be restricted or forbidden).  The debate 
is clearly not ―hypothetical, or . . .  morally or legally 
irrelevant.‖22  Not only do too many assumptions go into a 
decision to use torture as a preventive interrogation technique, 
but the empirical odds of a detainee possessing valuable 
information—less than 0.1%—is notoriously discouraging.23  A 
cold cost-benefit analysis inspired by utilitarianism also does 
not unambiguously support torture.24  At any rate, the 
perpetual slippery-slope here is that unless we know that some 
forms of torture in some emergencies are unconstitutional, 
government torturers will always try to classify an emergency 
as a ―ticking-bomb scenario,‖ and may reach a point of 
dangerous insouciance in that fashion.  This approach cloaks 
officials with immediate immunity and precludes the plaintiff 
from ever recovering relief. 
Puzzlingly, the possibilities could range from ―This torture 
did work!‖ to ―The attackers are aiming for a bigger target 
later.‖  Even more importantly, usually it will not be known 
whether future scenarios similarly require (or do not require) 
torture.  Conversely, when the government does torture and 
the information gained from the interrogated is used and the 
 
22. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic 
Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1487 (2004). 
23. See Jeannine Bell, “Behind This Mortal Bone”: The (In)Effectiveness 
of Torture, 83 IND. L.J. 339, 352 (2008) (―More than 5000 foreign nationals 
were detained between September 11, 2001, and the time the photos at Abu 
Ghraib were publicized.  Four years after the detention, only three were 
charged, and two of those were acquitted.  Such a low hit rate, three charges 
out of more than 5000 detainees, certainly suggested that the Allied Forces 
were just guessing whether the detainees possessed intelligence with the 
lifesaving potential . . . .  A hit rate of 0.06% seems awfully low to justify a 
practice that has the moral and ethical problems of torture ‗lite.‘‖).  See also 
Elaine Scarry, Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in TORTURE: 
A COLLECTION 281-90 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (pointing out that it is 
speculative whether the subject of prospective coercive interrogation even 
possesses the requisite information, let alone whether this interrogation will 
yield that information; it is another fine line to interrogate in a manner that 
is coercive enough to be preventive but not so much as to become punitive, for 
the latter is a punishment that can only be imposed post-trial). 
24. See, e.g., Jean Maria Arrigo, A Utilitarian Argument Against Torture 
Interrogation of Terrorists, 10 SCI. & ENG‘G ETHICS 543 (2004); JOHN CONROY, 
UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF TORTURE 112 (2000); 
Joseph Lelyveld, Interrogating Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 6 
(Magazine), available at 2005 WLNR 9302778; Saul M. Kassin, On the 
Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 215 (2005). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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attack is stopped, there is no strict causal evidence suggesting 
that but for the torture, the attack would have been executed.  
Reduced to its essentials, the moral philosopher Judith Jarvis 
Thomson‘s ―trolley problem‖ would permit this manner of 
torture: torture of one person takes no life and might save 
many other lives.25  To end the inquiry here, however, would 
ignore Anglo-American historical and constitutional traditions 
that respect bodily integrity and truth-seeking in criminal 
procedure. 
Human dignity cannot be separated from the torture 
inquiry; it is the linchpin connecting the Fifth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the constitutional issues raised 
here.  The uniform relevance of these constitutional provisions 
transcending time and space bespeaks the vision and intent of 
their Drafters.  The question is governed, if not haunted, by 
Abraham Lincoln‘s now-famous assertion that ―As I would not 
be a slave, so I would not be a master.‖26  This statement is 
best characterized as a measure of empathy in the most 
measured sense.  It is a reflection of its author‘s ability to 
understand the process at issue, while simultaneously 
engaging in self-check and self-regulation such that no 
unexamined biases and sympathies undermine a neutral, 
dispassionate and objective inquiry.  Whether as a 
discrimination victim or as a torture victim, understanding 
how the process works from all sides of the equation—the 
powerful and the powerless—enriches the law.  On the torture 
issue, the statement says more about the torturer, for at the 
time of the torture not much is usually known about the 
turpitude of or knowledge possessed by the torturee. 
Some might say that imposing torture on the 
presupposition of a ticking bomb would be prudent and rational 
under many tests.  But a government‘s imposition of that 
treatment does not detract from the fact that torture is morally 
troublesome (intrinsically) and creates an adverse and 
insidious precedent (purposively)—especially if conducted 
without safeguards.  Jean Améry characterizes the act itself, 
 
25. See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1395 (1985). 
26. LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY 121 (Mario M. Cuomo et al. eds., 2004) 
(quoting Abraham Lincoln: ―This expresses my idea of democracy.  Whatever 
differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is no democracy‖). 
9
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irrespective of details (including how many instances it has 
been imposed), as ―border violation of [self] by the other, which 
can be neither neutralized by the expectation of help nor 
rectified through resistance.‖27  Michel Foucault, somewhat 
bemusedly, attributes the disappearance of torture from the 
public sphere to society‘s ―humanization.‖28  Torture did not 
disappear altogether, however, and the irony of the Foucault 
inference (of which Foucault doubtless was aware) is that the 
hand of a torturer might even be strengthened by diminished 
visibility.  Talal Asad acknowledges that the ―modern 
dedication‖ to ridding the domain of what is lawful of torture 
―often conflicts with other commitments and values: the right 
of individuals to choose and the duty of the state to maintain 
its interests.‖29  This duality between the rights of the torturee 
and the rights of the innocent is where the Article becomes 
interesting. 
This is also where the need for nuance grows even 
stronger.  Details are terribly important, and there are many 
sides and counterpunches to the humanity argument.30  Alan 
Dershowitz concedes that allowing any torture is a symbolic 
step back for human rights.31  Adam Raviv responds, so what?  
According to Raviv, ―to argue that people‘s moral compasses 
will truly be damaged if torture is prohibited 99.9% of the time 
rather than 100%‖ is fanciful.32  In advancing his reluctant case 
 
27. JEAN AMÉRY, AT THE MIND‘S LIMITS: CONTEMPLATIONS BY A SURVIVOR 
ON AUSCHWITZ AND ITS REALITIES 33 (Sidney Rosenfeld & Stella P. Rosenfeld 
trans., 1980) (1966) (―[O]nly in torture does the transformation of the person 
into flesh become complete.  Frail in the face of violence, yelling out in pain, 
awaiting no help, capable of no resistance, the tortured person is only a body, 
and nothing else beside that.‖).  See also id. at 39 (the torturer becomes the 
―absolute sovereign,‖ now empowered ―to inflict suffering and destroy‖). 
28. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH 
OF THE PRISON (1975). 
29. Talal Asad, On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading 
Treatment, in SOCIAL SUFFERING 285 (Arthur Kleinman et al. eds., 1997). 
30. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of 
Civil Liberties in Time of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11 (1988).  
See also id. at 19 (―[A]bstract principles announcing the applicability of civil 
liberties during times of war and crisis are ineffectual when a war or other 
crisis comes along unless the principles are fleshed out by a detailed 
jurisprudence explaining how those civil liberties will be sustained against 
particularized national security concerns.‖). 
31. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 145. 
32. Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible, 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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for torture warrants, Dershowitz himself concluded that ―there 
are numerous instances in which torture has produced self-
proving, truthful information that was necessary to prevent 
harm to civilians.‖33  Moreover, Raviv argues, ―[j]ust because 
certain human rights norms are not absolute priorities of the 
state does not mean that the state has entirely lost respect for 
them.‖34  Balancing security with liberty is an experiment that 
has long bedeviled governments, and they are entitled to 
attempt to perfect it.  Richard Posner looks to world experience 
and concludes: France, the United Kingdom, and Israel have 
―used torture to extract information, yet none . . . has sunk into 
barbarism.‖35  The occasional restrictive use of torture does not, 
Posner suggests, lead to a complete meltdown in moral 
values.36  The variety of perspectives here, all on the humanity 
question, should elicit respect for nuance and complexity. 
But Professor Scott Goldberg is wrong to liken this line of 
argument with the observation that ―just as Americans have 
not lost respect for the right to freedom and self-determination 
in the face of a criminal justice system that takes that right 
from individuals in certain circumstances, they will not lose 
respect for the right to be free from torture if it is allowed in 
certain circumstances.‖37  Americans retain esteem and 
obedience for the rule of law because the rule of law does the 
same for their essential human dignity and because those 
punishments are proportionate to the crime, not abjectly 
rejected by history, and imposed after a fair trial with ―the full 
panoply of protections‖38—they are not imposed upon a hunch.  
It is considerably tougher to make that case for interrogative, 
 
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 144 (2004) (discussing Emanuel Gross, Legal 
Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of Democracy 
to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 89, 101 (2001)). 
33. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 137. 
34. Raviv, supra note 32, at 145. 
35. Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism and Interrogation, in 
TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 23, at 294. 
36. Id. 
37. Scott J. Goldberg, Torture: Considering a Framework for Limiting 
Use 13 (bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 946, 2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4581&context=expresso. 
38. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O‘Connor, J., 
concurring) (articulating that in the Anglo-American tradition trials are the 
crucibles that determine the culpability of the accused). 
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preventive, pre-trial torture. 
 
B. Supreme Court Decisions: Due Process and Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments 
 
There is no support, in the text or history of the 
Constitution, for the hypothesis that torture is not 
―punishment‖ within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.  The 
contemporary legal dictionary definition of ―punishment‖ is ―[a] 
penalty imposed on a defendant duly convicted of a crime by an 
authorized court,‖39 and there is no evidence to suggest that 
―punishment‖ meant something different when the Bill of 
Rights was proposed or ratified.  The error is exacerbated by 
the important detail providing that the unwarranted 
imposition of torture violates the Due Process Clause.40  How 
can torture, quintessentially a deprivation of liberty (to put it 
mildly), comport with the due process of law if imposed ex ante 
a fair trial, which would require finding the existence of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt?41  In this analysis, I would use a 
three-part test. 
First, due process requires notice and the opportunity to be 
heard before the government can deprive a person of her 
liberty or continue such deprivation for a period of time.  The 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Wilkinson v. Austin instructs that 
the ―liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of 
confinement . . . arise[s] from state policies or regulations.‖42  
The Court in Wilkinson, adhering to its earlier decision in 
Mathews v. Eldridge,43 required ―notice of the factual basis 
 
39. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW 428 (6th ed. 2006) (emphasis added). 
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V (―No person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .‖).  The Fifth Amendment 
applies to the Federal Government‘s actions, whereas the Fourteenth 
Amendment—―nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law‖—applies the protections to state 
conduct.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
41. It is well-settled that ―reasonable doubt‖ is the proper criminal law 
standard both in state court and in federal habeas corpus proceedings.  See 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
368 (1970).  See also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: 
EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 15 (1977). 
42. 545 U.S. 209, 222 (2005). 
43. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing a framework for evaluating 
procedural due process and determining what constitutes a liberty interest). 
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leading to consideration‖ of harsh confinement ―and a fair 
opportunity for rebuttal.‖44  The government must ―play by its 
own rules,‖45 and must not deprive the torturee of a ―fair 
warning.‖46  This constitutional analysis involved the duration 
and conditions of punishment.  The constitutional safeguards 
were grounded both in law and in reliability: ―these are among 
the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of 
avoiding erroneous deprivations.‖47  That is just the first step of 
the inquiry. 
Second, consistent with prevailing judicial precedents, the 
appropriate punishment has to be determined.  Determining 
whether torture is ―warranted,‖ to be sure, implicates the hard-
to-discern ―sliding scale‖—theoretically, at least, more sound 
than a strict tiered-approach.  That accounts for the usual 
proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment, which 
is discussed later in this Article.  But it also implicates the core 
requirements of due process.  The Eighth Amendment and due 
process might not be strictly coextensive but they do overlap, 
especially in cases where particularly harsh treatment of a 
detainee (as punishment or as preventive interrogation) is 
followed by a cursory or nonexistent fact-finding procedure.  
Along with Mathews and Wilkinson, the Court‘s holding in 
Sandin v. Conner provides that in order for a prisoner to 
maintain a viable constitutional claim, he must face atypical 
and significant hardship, which is harsher than normal prison 
life.48  In the pre-trial context, we might transpose this rule to 
conclude that the degree to which a hardship significantly 
 
44. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225-26. 
45. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000) (reversing defendant‘s 
conviction of sex crimes on the grounds that it violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution).  In Carmell, a Texas law providing that the 
victim‘s testimony alone was sufficient for conviction came into effect after 
petitioner committed certain sex offenses.  At the time the offenses were 
committed, the law required that the victim‘s testimony be corroborated by 
other evidence in order to support a conviction.  The Court found that such 
prosecution infringes on ―fundamental fairness‖ as it is only advantageous to 
the State.  See generally Carmell, 529 U.S. 513. 
46. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (defining ―fair 
warning‖ as an individual‘s ability to rely on the meaning of a law until it is 
explicitly changed). 
47. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226. 
48. 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (holding that respondent‘s placement in 
segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant 
deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest). 
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outweighs the usual inconveniences and conditions of pre-trial 
detention is an important factor in the due process inquiry. 
Wilkinson reaffirmed Sandin, holding that ―a liberty 
interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may 
arise from state policies or regulations.‖49  The Ohio prison 
procedure upheld by the Wilkinson Court was characterized as 
―informal‖ and ―non-adversarial,‖ and therefore, considering 
that neither label applies to a torture scenario, Wilkinson does 
not reflexively immunize torture punishments from due process 
challenges.50  Wilkinson maintained that ―the touchstone of the 
inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty 
interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not 
the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the 
nature of those conditions themselves ‗in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life.‘‖51  Put another way: was the 
conduct to which the torturee was subjected notably harsher 
than what an ordinary prisoner would face?  Or, were there 
compelling, or at the bare minimum, rational reasons?  Or 
finally, was the treatment excessive?  Sandin creates a difficult 
standard for plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring evidence that the 
time and duration of confinement exacted a significant and 
atypical hardship constituting the deprivation of a liberty 
interest protected by due process.52  But that more demanding 
standard is not implicated in the cases of pre-trial detainees, 
including torturees. 
Moreover, some lower federal courts now hold that the 
imposition of painful physical restraints during the movement 
of pretrial detainees require ―reasonable after-the-fact 
procedural protections to ensure that such restrictions on 
liberty will be terminated reasonably soon if they have no 
justification.‖53  Of course, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme 
Court pieced together these different standards and rules.54 
The Court then restated the test for deciding if a condition of 
confinement (which may well include torture, in which case the 
government‘s burden becomes nearly insurmountable) was 
 
49. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 222. 
50. See id. at 229. 
51. Id. at 223 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). 
52. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 
53. Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2001). 
54. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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unconstitutional under due process: 
 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability or restraint, whether it has historically 
been regarded as a punishment, whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, 
whether its operation will promote the 
traditional aims of punishment — retribution 
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it 
applies is already a crime, whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it 
appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned . . . .55 
 
A third step, I demur, is also necessary in light of the historical 
Eighth Amendment condemnation (even though this is a due 
process inquiry) against torture.  This step concerns something 
more than a proportionality analysis; it asks why the 
defendant must suffer a punishment that constitutional history 
forbids.  Why must the absolute limitation on torture as 
punishment be infringed?  The sentencing court must 
painstakingly analyze why, flying in the face of constitutional 
history, the categorical constitutional prohibition on torture as 
punishment might be breached.  This line should not be 
crossed.  While ―adjudicating constitutional claims rooted in 
the Magna Carta or other common law institutions, the 
[Supreme] Court [previously has] noted [that] ‗[o]ne of the 
consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the 
rights of English subjects.‘‖56  Constitutional courts in the 
United States have no power to roll back or retrench a 
constitutional right considered and protected (in that specific 
sense) by the Framers.  That would set a pernicious precedent 
and remove a constraint which has worked rather well 
throughout the Republic‘s past. 
If humanity is the aim of due process and the Eighth 
 
55. Id. at 537-38 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). 
56. Riddhi Dasgupta, Boumediene v. Bush and Extraterritorial Habeas 
Corpus in Wartime, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 425, 442 & n.125 (2009) 
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983)). 
15
2010] TICKING-BOMB SCENARIO 559 
Amendment‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, then 
ensuring the veracity and accuracy of confessions and 
information is the goal of the Fifth Amendment‘s Self-
Incrimination Clause.  The self-incrimination privilege states: 
―[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.‖57  That right, ―closely linked 
historically with the abolition of torture,‖ is considered a 
―landmark[ ] in man‘s struggle to make himself civilized.‖58  
The Fifth Amendment‘s privilege against self-incrimination is 
functionally equivalent to any constitutional proscription 
against torture as a means of the suspect incriminating herself.  
The privilege does not protect the suspect from being a witness 
against another entity.59  Professor Erwin Griswold defined the 
privilege as ―one of the fundamental decencies in the relation 
we have developed between government and man.‖60  Moreover, 
it is ―a rule of conduct generally to be followed by our Nation‘s 
officialdom.  It counsels officers of the United States (and of 
any State of the United States) against extracting testimony 
when the person examined reasonably fears that his words 
would be used against him in a later criminal prosecution.‖61  
There is no strong reason why ―the [Fifth] Amendment 
ordinarily [w]ould [not] command the respect of United States 
interrogators, whether the prosecution reasonably feared by 
the examinee is domestic or foreign.‖62  Just as constitutional 
 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
58. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT TODAY 7-8 (1955) (The 
Fifth Amendment articulates ―one of the fundamental decencies in the 
relation we have developed between government and man.‖).  See also Eben 
Moglen, The Privilege in British North America: the Colonial Period to the 
Fifth Amendment, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS 
AND DEVELOPMENT 109 (R. H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997). 
59. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906); Louis C. Wyman, A Common Sense View of the Fifth 
Amendment, 51 J. OF CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCI. 155, 155 (1960); 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 119 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); 81 AM. 
JUR. 2D Witnesses § 96 (2004).  
60. GRISWOLD, supra note 58, at 8. 
61. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 701 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
62. Id. at 702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. 
v. Agency for Int‘l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―[J]ust as our flag carries its 
message . . . both at home and abroad, so does our Constitution and the 
values it expresses.‖); United States v. Tiede, 86 F. R. D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for 
Berlin 1979) (holding that a foreign national, accused of hijacking a Polish 
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and statutory habeas corpus govern the custodian of the 
prisoner rather than the prisoner herself,63 the Fifth 
Amendment‘s command usually applies to the official rather 
than the prisoner. 
Two principles of constitutional law are in some tension 
here: the first is the notion that even ―a case that may be of 
extraordinary importance‖ should be ―resolved by ordinary 
rules.‖64  The second is the fact that there is a difference 
between torture as punishment and torture as a preventive 
deterrent.  If the two forms of torture are functionally different, 
there is no uniform constitutional rule covering both situations.  
One plausible exception is the prospect that constitutionally-
approved torture as punishment will be considered as 
approving, a fortiori, the prospect of torture in tightly-defined 
preventive scenarios.  Torture as punishment might be an 
―unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain‖ lacking in redeeming 
penological purposes applicable to that particular criminal and 
his crime(s).65  Sanctioning torture within that context might 
prove to be a slippery slope.  If the causality between torture 
and penological purposes is defined loosely enough, many other 
questionable treatments (aside from torture) could be 
approved.  That entire line of decisions, consolidated by 
Hudson v. McMillian, a case concerning the ―use of excessive 
physical force against a prisoner,‖ asks ―whether force was 
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 
or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.‖66 
A prisoner need not, under Hudson, demonstrate that this 
force caused a ―significant injury.‖67  The Supreme Court 
rejected the contention, expressed in Justice Clarence Thomas‘s 
dissenting opinion, that ―claims based on excessive force and 
 
aircraft overseas, was entitled to the constitutional right of a jury trial when 
tried under German law in a Berlin court created by the United States)). 
63. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 
(1973) (―The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks 
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful 
custody.‖). 
64. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part). 
65. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).  
66. Id. at 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 
(1986)). 
67. Id. at 9. 
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claims based on conditions of confinement are no different in 
kind.‖68  The majority countered that ―[t]o deny . . . the 
difference between punching a prisoner in the face and serving 
him unappetizing food is to ignore the ‗concepts of dignity, 
civilized standards, humanity, and decency that animate the 
Eighth Amendment.‘‖69  The ―contextual‖ analysis bears upon a 
proportional relationship between the conduct of the prisoner 
and the response of the prison officials.70  The Hudson Court 
refused unequivocally to resurrect the prison-inhabitation 
mirror image of the confession-oriented Star Chamber‘s third-
degree treatment—―the inquisitorial method of putting the 
accused upon his oath and compelling him to answer questions 
designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without evidence from 
another source.‖71  Nothing displaced the analogy even though 
this treatment was to happen not pursuant to a legislative or 
judicial order but upon the whim of prison officials. 
Hudson is, by no means, sui generis.72  It was the product 
of a long line of substantive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  
A bright star in this constellation is Trop v. Dulles, where a 
plurality of the Supreme Court established the proposition that 
the Amendment ―draw[s] its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.‖73  This manner of currently prevailing ―original 
historicism‖ in interpreting the Amendment ―is characterized 
by subtly calibrated, gradual modification of doctrine that 
tracks changes in the public‘s settled convictions concerning 
 
68. Id. at 11. 
69. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
70. Id. at 8 (―What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause depends upon the claim at issue, 
for two reasons.  First, the general requirement that an Eighth Amendment 
claimant allege and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain 
should . . . be applied with due regard for differences in the kind of conduct 
against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged.  Second, the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments draws its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society, and so admits of few absolute limitations.‖ (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
71. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990). 
72. Stare decisis requires contextual analysis whereby an aberration or 
two from lines and lines of settled cases and, of course, from clearly opposite 
constitutional text stand with far less precedential force than vice versa. 
73. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality). 
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specific types of punitive practices.‖74  Courts look to objective 
evidence to confirm those conclusions,75 but they are also 
required to ―bring their ‗own judgment . . . to bear.‘‖76  This 
interpretive method presupposes, as it must, the ―normative 
premise that [the ‗evolving standards‘] doctrine ought to be 
adjusted to take into account enduring, widespread changes in 
fundamental values when those changes are consistent with 
the direction charted by the [F]ramers.‖77  In death penalty 
cases, for instance, the Court has categorically exempted from 
capital punishment certain classes of persons, namely minors,78 
the mentally retarded,79 and the insane,80 as well as cases 
involving the commission of non-homicidal person-on-person 
crimes.81  In non-death penalty criminal cases, the Court has 
established a ―narrow proportionality‖ test to analyze if the 
punishment imposed is ―grossly disproportionate‖ to the 
crime.82  And cases arising out of the prison context, such as 
Estelle v. Gamble83 and Whitley v. Albers,84 reaffirm the 
application of the evolving-standards prescription to the post-
sentencing, prison-inhabitation scenario. 
Prison officials have more than an obligation not to invade 
rights; they must also affirmatively protect the safety and 
health of the prisoners, including their medical needs.  If the 
official conduct challenged in an Eighth Amendment suit ―d[id] 
not conflict with competing administrative concerns‖ and ―force 
 
74. William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of 
the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
1355, 1390 (2005).  See also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 82-83 (1921). 
75. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (―[C]ourts should be 
guided by objective factors that our cases have recognized.‖); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). 
76. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 
(1977) (plurality)). 
77. Heffernan, supra note 74, at 1390 (emphasis added). 
78. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), overruling Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
79. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), overruling Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
80. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
81. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
82. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
83. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
84. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 
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was applied [not] in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline [but] maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm,‖ Eighth Amendment relief might be 
available.85  These precedents, notably quoting Farmer v. 
Brennan, establish a ―deliberate indifference‖ test to decide 
whether an official‘s response overstepped the Eighth 
Amendment‘s boundaries.86  We operate well outside that box 
when torture is at issue.  Creating a ―significant injury‖ 
requirement for triggering the Eighth Amendment would open 
the city gates to ―some arbitrary quantity of injury‖—if that 
threshold was not met, then ―the Eighth Amendment would 
permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or 
inhuman.‖87 
In Estelle, the Supreme Court candidly announced that 
forbidding torture and barbarous punishment was ―the primary 
concern of the [Eighth Amendment‘s] drafters.‖88  Likewise, in 
Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court ―affirm[ed] that punishments of 
torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary 
cruelty, are forbidden by‖ the Amendment.89  To the Wilkerson 
Court, these ―punishments of torture,‖ characterized as 
―atrocities,‖ involved situations where the defendant ―was 
embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered,‖ and cases ―of 
public dissection . . . and burning alive.‖90  Surely, the state of 
knowledge about torture at that point in history cannot limit 
modern constitutional analysis to the 1791 baseline.  It would 
be one thing to state that there is no historical reference to 
torture that falls within the Eighth Amendment‘s scope, and 
only tangentially within the sweep of the Due Process Clause 
(an argument which is unavailing), and quite another to 
suggest that the definition of torture should be limited to what 
was known by the Framers.  The latter argument would 
discredit originalism as unworkable and too academic to be 
pragmatic, or simply as a flight of fancy.  This is also the 
 
85. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
86. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1994). 
87. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. 
88. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (referring to Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. 
REV. 839, 842 (1969)). 
89. 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (citation omitted). 
90. Id. at 135-36. 
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reason that this Article does not attempt to construct a 
comprehensive definition of torture.91 
The constitutional law variant of the ejusdem generis 
doctrine does not choke off all other forms of torture from being 
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.  At any rate, the 
―evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society‖92 recognize that at the very least, while 
paying due caution to the limited policing role of American 
courts (both federal and state), torture as post-trial 
punishment is unconstitutional and torture as a pre-trial 
preventive interrogation technique raises serious constitutional 
questions.  Without adequate safeguards in place, the latter 
concerns ossify into constitutional violations.  Recognition of 
these ―evolving standards‖ is at the forefront of proportionality 
analysis through ―objective factors to the maximum possible 
extent.‖93  The Supreme Court has ―pinpointed that the clearest 
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is 
 
91. Waterboarding, malnutrition, starvation, sexual abuse and 
intimidation (including rape), homicide, battery, assault, usage of the ―Tucker 
telephone,‖ incessant harassment, and the giving of cause to believe that the 
interrogated or others will be harmed are forms of torture, but they do not 
represent the whole picture.  The events at Abu Ghraib, which came to public 
attention, particularly stretched the imagination further and wider on this 
front.  See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 14 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (prisoner abuse 
within the Eighth Amendment includes ―lashing prisoners with leather 
straps, whipping them with rubber hoses, beating them with naked fists, 
shocking them with electric currents, asphyxiating them short of death, 
intentionally exposing them to undue heat or cold, or forcibly injecting them 
with psychosis-inducing drugs‖); Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib: 
American Soldiers Brutalized Iraqis.  How Far up does the Responsibility 
Go?, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, available at http://www.newyorker. 
com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact; HANIA MUFTI, HUMAN RTS. WATCH, 
THE NEW IRAQ?  TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN IRAQI CUSTODY 
(Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11864/section/ (―Methods of 
torture or ill-treatment cited included routine beatings to the body using a 
variety of implements such as cables, hosepipes and metal rods.  Detainees 
reported kicking, slapping and punching; prolonged suspension from the 
wrists with the hands tied behind the back; electric shocks to sensitive parts 
of the body, including the earlobes and genitals; and being kept blindfolded 
and/or handcuffed continuously for several days.  In several cases, the 
detainees suffered what may be permanent physical disability.‖).  See also 
GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 1 (2005). 
92. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
93. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (quoting Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)). 
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the legislation enacted by the country‘s legislatures.‖94  The 
Court has also retained the caveat that ―objective evidence, 
though of great importance, d[oes] not wholly determine the 
controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end 
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the 
acceptability.‖95  While the first prong (looking to trend and 
direction of the Nation‘s values to rectify one or two aberrant 
jurisdictions) has a democratic flavor, the second prong 
(judicial review against a Nation gone mad) gives us pause and 
also the hope that this doctrine will be invoked only in the most 
exceptional cases. 
Along the same ―evolving standards‖ line of thinking, the 
Supreme Court, in Weems v. United States, stated the 
proposition as a ban ―against the infliction of punishment[s] so 
severe as not to fit the crime.‖96  The proposition depends ―both 
on account of th[e] degree and [the] kind‖97 of the punishment 
imposed.  Connecting the dots for the Wilkerson rule, 
furthermore, Weems held that the Eighth Amendment‘s 
meaning is ―elastic,‖ ―indefinite‖ and ―must be capable of wider 
application than the mischief which gave it birth.‖98  The 
Weems Court, referencing In re Kemmler, stated that 
―[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a 
lingering death.‖99  Weems also referenced the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689 as authority that proportionality analysis was a 
goal of the English common law carried over to the American 
colonies.100  Then, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber defined 
a ―cruel and unusual punishment‖ as that which, in 
contravention of ―[t]he traditional humanity of modern Anglo-
American law,‖ nonetheless ―inflict[s] . . . unnecessary pain.‖101 
Evidence of intent, in some cases, might be necessary to 
 
94. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
95. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
96. 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. Id. at 377. 
98. Id. at 373 (―Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, 
it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, 
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.  
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.‖). 
99. Id. at 370 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). 
100. See id. at 402. 
101. 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). 
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prove a constitutional violation, but if ―unnecessary pain‖ 
recurs over and over again and if reasonable safeguards are not 
taken to diminish that possibility, then that creates a 
constitutional violation.  The torture as punishment issue 
therefore is closer to the Farmer standard (―deliberate 
indifference‖) than to the artificially cramped definition of 
intent developed in some decisions.  Discrimination occurs 
when intent is ―‗because of,‘ not merely ‗in spite of,‘ [the 
action‘s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.‖102 
As devised in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,103 the 
Court applied this concept of intent in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,104 
where it held that to prove discrimination, a detainee must 
―show that petitioners adopted and implemented the detention 
policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for 
the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or 
national origin‖ or otherwise violating the detainee‘s rights.  In 
Iqbal, which figures prominently in Part III (discussion of 
qualified immunity), the Court explicitly notes that ―the 
plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with 
discriminatory purpose.‖105  However, the Court did not explain 
whether a pattern of discriminatory effects (disparate impact), 
especially in the face of easier alternatives which might abate 
(or entirely rid society of) that discrimination, begins to appear 
systematic.106  This is a matter of iterations and the 
 
102. Pers. Adm‘r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
103. Id. at 256. 
104. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009).  See also id. at 1948 (―Under extant 
precedent purposeful discrimination requires more than ‗intent as volition or 
intent as awareness of consequences.‘‖ (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279)). 
105. Id. at 1948. 
106. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 540 (1993) (―Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the 
historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of 
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the 
legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements 
made by members of the [decision-making] body.  These objective factors bear 
on the question of discriminatory object.‖ (citations omitted)); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (―[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may 
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it 
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.  It is also 
not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact . . . may for all practical 
purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because, in various circumstances, 
the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.‖).  For an 
illustrative piece demonstrating the issues litigators face trying to prove 
―intent‖ in disparate impact cases, see also William Cohen, Proving 
23
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consideration applies to methods, duration and conditions of 
torture, all of which attend a due process or an Eighth 
Amendment analysis of pre-trial torture‘s constitutionality. 
Even though torture to impose punishment is 
constitutionally out-of-bounds, the constitutionality of torture 
as a preventive deterrent is more complex.  Context matters.107 
The level of scrutiny that a government policy invites depends, 
as a broad (if nebulous) rule, on ―the constitutional and societal 
importance of the interest adversely affected and the 
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular 
classification is drawn.‖108  Rational basis scrutiny, as 
understood by the Supreme Court‘s presently governing law, 
might sustain well-regulated and time- and means-limited 
torture for the sole or primary purpose of future terrorism 
prevention.  That degree of judicial care when reviewing the 
constitutionality of government actions merely asks whether 
there was a plausible reason for the government to act the way 
it did.  So long as the law does not discriminate on the basis of 
race, sex, sexual orientation or other prohibited characteristics, 
the policy or law will be sustained.109  Some of those 
characteristics might be the residency of the entity (states may 
not discriminate on that basis) or the differential structuring of 
 
Discriminatory Intent in Constitutional Law Disparate Impact Cases, 14 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 78 (1991). 
107. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) 
(―Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so 
patently egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the 
constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact 
analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as 
conscience-shocking.‖).  ―[A]ttention to the markedly different circumstances 
of normal pretrial custody and high-speed law enforcement chases shows why 
the deliberate indifference that shocks in the one case is less egregious in the 
other (even assuming that it makes sense to speak of indifference as 
deliberate in the case of sudden pursuit).‖  Id. at 851.  The Estelle context is 
the ―normal pretrial custody‖ while the Lewis context is the ―high-speed law 
enforcement chase[ ].‖  See id. 
108. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
109. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (―[T]he Equal 
Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for 
the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is 
apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the 
governmental [decision-maker], and the relationship of the classification to 
its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or 
irrational.‖ (citations omitted)). 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
568 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
tax laws.110 
What happens under strict scrutiny?  First, the deterrent 
effect of torture must be established as a compelling 
governmental interest, in light of the current situation and the 
information possessed by the officials in charge at the time; 
and, secondly, torture must be the narrowest and least drastic 
means of furthering that interest.111  But such analysis is 
extremely fact-specific, and penalizing officials post-hoc carries 
the risk of illegitimacy.  We are, by that time, temporally 
disconnected from the imminent and time-sensitive decision-
making that the officials were required to undertake; judging 
these executive decisions in hindsight is risky.  Based on 
existing case-law on prison officials‘ qualified immunity claims, 
there will be a presumption in the vast majority of cases that 
the officials acted responsibly in light of the facts and risks 
then-present before them.  Hudson and Whitley, themselves, 
planted that seed: prison officials are often required to act ―in 
haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a 
second chance‖112 and those determinations (unless 
―malicious[s] or sadisti[c]‖113) deserve deference.  There might 
be all the more reason that the presumption will carry over to 
the government official in the ticking-bomb torture context.  
That does the torturee no good. 
 
 
110. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass‘n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107 
(2003) (―The law in question does not distinguish on the basis of, for example, 
race or gender.  It does not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state 
businesses.  Neither does it favor a State‘s long-time residents at the expense 
of residents who have more recently arrived from other States.‖ (citations 
omitted)).  See also FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) 
(―In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither 
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights 
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification.‖); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 
(1959) (the Equal Protection Clause requires state tax laws to ―proceed upon 
a rational basis‖ and not to ―resort to a classification that is palpably 
arbitrary‖). 
111. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 
(1995) (―Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a 
compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further 
that interest.‖). 
112. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). 
113. Id. at 6 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21). 
25
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C. Relevance of the Self-Incrimination Privilege 
 
Past conduct is forbidden fruit under this exceedingly 
limited detour from ordinary standards of due process.114 
Admitting into evidence confessions derived from torture would 
eviscerate the fine line-drawing attempted here, and effectively 
obviate the Supreme Court‘s landmark decisions in Brown v. 
Mississippi115 and Miranda v. Arizona.116  These decisions 
render inadmissible statements (both inculpatory and 
exculpatory) attained through violence, coercion, or asymmetry 
of information that might induce fear.  Brown was based on 
due process (before the Fifth Amendment was incorporated to 
apply to the States) and Miranda was based on the Fifth 
Amendment, which had been directly incorporated by the 
Fourteenth to apply to the States.  Purposively-speaking, 
however, what Brown read the Constitution to require, 
Miranda converted into a ―prophylactic‖ rule,117 thus bridging 
the strait between Brown and its enforcement.  Despite the 
criticism and judicial trimming that Miranda has endured in 
the years since, its core remains alive.118 
 
114. See, e.g., David Luban, Essay, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking 
Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2005) (―The crucial difference lies in the fact 
that the confession is backward-looking, in that it aims to document and 
ratify the past for purposes of retribution, while intelligence gathering is 
forward-looking because it aims to gain information to forestall future evils 
like terrorist attacks.‖); Gross, supra note 22, at 1487-88. 
115. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that confessions exacted by torture 
and police violence violate due process and may not be admitted into trial as 
evidence). 
116. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that defendant must be informed of 
her right to an attorney and her privilege against self-incrimination before 
and during questioning by police; otherwise, inculpatory and exculpatory 
statements gained from such questioning are inadmissible). 
117. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 652-53 (1984). 
118. The Supreme Court and individual Justices have, in a variety of 
cases, said, in effect, that Miranda rights are merely ―prophylactic,‖ designed 
to stop Fifth Amendment violations (and ―not themselves rights protected by 
the Constitution.‖).  See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). 
Nevertheless, in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Court 
expressly reaffirmed Miranda.  But see Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 
457-58 (1994) (holding that a defendant who was given a Miranda warning 
must explicitly demand an attorney in order to cease interrogation so that 
counsel could be present); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1993) 
(―Miranda‟s safeguards are not constitutional in character.‖); Duckworth v. 
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (holding that Miranda warnings need not be 
given in the exact form described in Miranda, but simply must reasonably 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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Even if one does not support the formalist difference 
between applying the self-incrimination privilege in an 
interrogation context as opposed to the trial itself, it is indeed a 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Of their own volition, 
some States permit and some even mandate testimonial 
protection for certain relationships, such as spousal and 
parent-child kinships.  Neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment has been held to require such protections.  
Consequently, there exists no constitutionally-guaranteed 
privilege against incriminating others, absent such a provision 
being affirmatively made by positive law enacted by the States 
and by Congress.  Like in the Sixth Amendment‘s 
Confrontation Clause context,119 the self-incrimination test 
requires that the statement or information secured from the 
defendant be ―testimonial.‖120  Both the Confrontation Clause 
and the Self-Incrimination Clause define ―witness‖ (or 
―witnesses‖) broadly enough to strike out most categories of 
out-of-court testimony, many of which are practically 
unreliable and all of which are constitutionally unreliable.121 
 
convey to a suspect his rights); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 
(1987) (―[T]he Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate 
the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights . . . .‖); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298, 306 (1985) (holding that ―[w]here a Fourth Amendment violation ‗taints‘ 
the confession, a finding of voluntariness for the purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment is merely a threshold requirement in determining whether the 
confession may be admitted in evidence‖ (citation omitted)); Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result) 
(recognizing Miranda as a general prophylactic rule). 
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . 
.‖).  See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (―Various 
formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions . . . statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial . . . .‖ (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
120. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000) (―The 
word ‗witness‘ in the constitutional text limits the relevant category of 
compelled incriminating communications to those that are ‗testimonial‘ in 
character.‖). 
121. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (―The central 
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Imagine how this type of reliability inquiry could affect 
constitutional provisions that establish specific requirements 
without giving courts discretion to evaluate alleged violations.  
Arguably, courts could someday say that what matters in 
interpreting the Ex Post Facto Clause122 is not the actual 
temporal order of the legislation enacted and the crime 
committed, but rather whether the legislature had a specific 
malicious intent in enacting the law after the commission of a 
crime.  Similarly, the admittance of ex parte testimony into 
trial is presumptively unconstitutional.  So serious and harsh 
is the office of Star Chamber-like ecclesiastical tribunals in 
Anglo-American history123 that the Supreme Court has 
expansively extended the self-incrimination privilege. 
The Court has accomplished this project by expanding the 
scope of the terms ―testimonial‖ evidence and ―witness.‖124 
 
concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the 
evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in 
the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.‖). 
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal prohibition); U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1 (states).  See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003); Calder v. 
Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1798) (Chase, J.) (―I will state what laws I consider 
ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition.  1st.  
Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.  2d. 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed.  3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.  
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the offence, in order to convict the offender.  All these, and similar laws, are 
manifestly unjust and oppressive.‖ (emphasis added)).  The ―manifestly 
unjust and oppressive‖ depiction, though subjective, is immaterial here 
because it is a descriptive rather than controlling rule to apply.  Similarly, in 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 137-38 (1810), the Court saw the Ex Post Facto 
Clause as a safeguard against ―violent acts which might grow out of the 
feelings of the moment.‖ 
123. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *266 (Star chamber ―consist[ed] of diverse lords spiritual and 
temporal, being privy counselors, together with two judges of the courts of 
common law, without the intervention of any jury.  Their jurisdiction 
extended legally over riots, perjury, misbehavior of sheriffs, and other 
notorious misdemeanors, contrary to the laws of the land‖).  
124. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 50 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (―[T]he term ‗witness‘ meant a person who gives or furnishes 
evidence, a broader meaning than that which our case law currently ascribes 
to the term.  If this is so, a person who responds to a subpoena duces tecum 
would be just as much a ‗witness‘ as a person who responds to a subpoena ad 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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Justice Joseph Story used the phrases ―to give evidence‖ and 
―to furnish evidence‖ to explain self-incrimination.125  This 
right has not been confined to what the defendant said or did 
not say (literally or verbally) once in custody or on the witness 
stand.  Even the act-of-production doctrine ―provides that 
persons compelled to turn over incriminating papers or other 
physical evidence pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum or a 
summons may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination as a bar to production‖ when ―the act of 
producing the evidence would contain ‗testimonial features.‘‖126  
The case of Counselman v. Hitchcock went so far as to hold that 
an ―ancient principle of the law‖ is that ―a witness shall not be 
compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give 
testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to 
fines, penalties or forfeitures.‖127 
English common law recognized that this giving of 
testimony or evidence encompassed the coerced production of 
archives, books, and records.  The state constitutional 
conventions were aware of this line of English cases 
interspersed throughout the 18th century.128  This terminology, 
in meaning if not in text, shares a certain kinship with the 
Fourth Amendment‘s protection of ―persons, houses, papers 
 
testificandum.  Dictionaries published around the time of the founding 
included definitions of the term ‗witness‘ as a person who gives or furnishes 
evidence.  Legal dictionaries of that period defined ‗witness‘ as someone who 
‗gives evidence in a cause.‘ 2 G. Jacob, A New Law-Dictionary (8th ed. 1762); 
2 T. Cunningham, New and Complete Law-Dictionary (2d ed. 1771); T. Potts, 
A Compendious Law Dictionary 612 (1803); 6 G. Jacob, The Law-Dictionary 
450 (T. Tomlins 1st American ed. 1811).  And a general dictionary published 
earlier in the century similarly defined ‗witness‘ as ‗a giver of evidence.‘  J. 
Kersey, A New English Dictionary (1702). The term ‗witness‘ apparently 
continued to have this meaning at least until the first edition of Noah 
Webster‘s dictionary, which defined it as ‗that which furnishes evidence or 
proof.‘ An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828).‖ (emphasis 
added)). 
125. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 931 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic 
Press 1987) (1833). 
126. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
127. 142 U.S. 547, 563-64 (1892) (citations omitted). 
128. Justice Thomas‘s concurring opinion in Hubbell does a remarkable 
job of reciting this history.  See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 52-53 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (discussing various states‘ declarations affirming the right 
against self-incrimination during the pre-constitutional period). 
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and effects‖ (which cannot be unreasonably searched or subject 
to seizure).129  That Amendment historically insists on 
protecting the dignity of the individual130 by employing the 
―reasonableness inquiry,‖131 which evaluates the nature of the 
arrest and detention (including treatment) and the available 
evidence. 
Both the history and the public policy arguments 
underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause maintain that the 
privilege may be invoked ―to resist compelled explicit or 
implicit disclosures of incriminating information.  Historically, 
the privilege was intended to prevent the use of legal 
compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn communication 
of facts which would incriminate him.‖132  ―The 18th-century 
common-law privilege against self-incrimination protected 
against the compelled production of incriminating physical 
evidence such as papers and documents‖133 and in this digital 
era, it now extends to private electronic data.  At the end of the 
day, the interrogated then finds herself in an unenviable 
Catch-22: if she concedes her involvement, then she may be 
charged.  Alternatively, if the interrogated declines to claim 
involvement, then the privilege either becomes too watered 
down or does not apply at all.   
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the self-
incrimination privilege, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
prohibits using pre-trial torture to secure evidence of the 
 
129. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
130. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (there is significant doubt as to ―whether the fiercely proud 
men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to 
be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such 
indignity‖). 
131. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 361 (2001) 
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (courts have a constitutional obligation to ―evaluate 
the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual‘s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests‖ (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  See also id. at 347 (majority opinion) (―[The 
specific litigant‘s] claim to live free of pointless indignity and confinement 
clearly outweighs anything the [arresting authority] can raise against it 
specific to her case.‖). 
132. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34 n.8 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 
201, 212 (1988)). 
133. Id. at 51 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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suspect‘s culpability.  The Court‘s Eighth Amendment 
precedents similarly proscribe post-trial torture, irrespective of 
whether ―significant injury‖ is caused.  With respect to the 
torture warrants, this analysis receives further comment in 
Part III. 
Moreover, there remains a practical imperative to borrow 
from international and foreign law in order to understand the 
ramifications of our own question.  To properly delineate the 
United States‘ governing constitutional law on the question of 
torture in a ticking-bomb scenario, we must not be insulated 
from the rest of the world.  Relevant are the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (―UNCAT‖),134 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,135 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),136 and the 
Geneva Conventions137—and the State practices of Israel and 
other terrorism-challenged foreign jurisdictions. 
For example, let us make the effort to define ―torture,‖ a 
question sure to arise under an Eighth Amendment challenge 
in United States federal courts.  How the international 
authorities listed above define ―torture‖ is not, in substantial 
part, so predicated upon foreign countries‘ unique histories and 
practices that the United States‘ constitutional doctrine finds 
nothing to learn from them.  Is it relevant to United States 
courts that the UNCAT defines ―torture‖ as: 
 
134. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by 
resolution of the U.N. General Assembly December 19, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 
at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
In October 1994, the United States ratified the UNCAT with the reservation 
that it will conform only to the extent required by the Eighth Amendment. 
135. See generally G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71-77, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
136. See generally G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. (Dec. 
16, 1966). 
137. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.  ―Torture of prisoners 
of war and others detained during wartime is prohibited by the third Geneva 
Convention protecting prisoners of war and the fourth Geneva Convention, 
which protects civilians during wartime.‖  Bell, supra note 22, at 343 n.14. 
31
2010] TICKING-BOMB SCENARIO 575 
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information 
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing 
him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind?138 
 
Is it relevant for our qualified immunity jurisprudence (certain 
to be claimed by government officials to avoid monetary 
damages) that the UNCAT forbids ―pain or suffering . . . 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity‖?139  In addition, does it matter that the 
UNCAT‘s ban on torture is absolute, non-derogable, and admits 
of ―[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever‖?140  Each of 
these questions should be answered in the affirmative. 
Shared humanity is another precept of human dignity, 
which is itself a resonating and recurring theme in the torture 
debate.  Human intricacies that we hold in common, the 
torturee‘s physical and mental responses to torture, and the 
law‘s own responsiveness to these details are not somehow 
worthless or unavailable to United States courts because the 
conversation first arose elsewhere.  On this important issue, 
United States courts and jurists must be careful to receive 
influence from, in addition to exerting influence on, the 
Western community.  Our relationship with the legal and 
political systems must be cautionary but cannot be parasitic.  
In order for our worldview to be relevant to the European 
Court of Human Rights or to France‘s Cour de cassation, we 
must engage with their perspectives.  Their views are not 
binding on United States courts, but they are relevant.  They 
help confirm the validity (or lack thereof) of our own 
conclusions, they are at least as valuable as law review articles, 
 




576 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
and they serve as ―common denominators of basic fairness 
governing relationships between the governors and the 
governed.‖141  Such comparative constitutional references help 
courts better understand the process or subject of an 
immediate case.  Recently there has been much debate and 
discourse in the United States over the propriety of our courts 
taking other Western tribunals‘ views into account. 
One criticism is that judges who are not nominated by the 
President of the United States nor confirmed by the Senate, as 
required by the Constitution (in Article II, Section 2, cl. 2), 
should not influence, causally or as confirmatory evidence, the 
judicial outcomes in American courts.  That view is logically 
inconsistent.142  Another illogical argument is that these 
international authorities should not be considered because they 
have not been accepted by the President or ratified by a two-
thirds majority of the Senate, which are the requirements for 
adopting a treaty (also required in Article II, Section 2, cl. 2 of 
the Constitution).143  United States courts could obviate the 
whole controversy regarding their references to and citations of 
foreign and international law by not doing so explicitly.  They 
always could do so sub silentio and no one would be the wiser 
(or, at least, be able to conclusively prove it).  In fact, Professor 
Laurence Tribe does characterize the Supreme Court‘s recent 
 
141. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme Court Assoc. Justice, 
Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: 
―A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind‖: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Apr. 1, 2005), 
http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html (quoting Patricia M. 
Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 431, 442 (2004)). 
142. Law professors, law students, and sometimes non-lawyers also 
influence the work of courts when judges read and are persuaded by their 
books or law review articles.  At least since the legal realism heyday, many 
law schools have retained on their faculties economists, philosophers, 
psychologists, and other social scientists sans legal backgrounds.  If the 
argument is that their work-products are based on American law, that is 
unavailing.  Sometimes the judges themselves are persuaded, directly or from 
legal literature, by non-legal literature.  This very Article, for instance, refers 
to works by Michel Foucault, Talal Asad, and Jean Améry, none of whom are 
lawyers or experts in American law.  Applying the anti-foreign and 
international law refrain (in United States constitutional cases) across the 
board would leave the constitutional reasoning of American courts too 
insular. 
143. Once again, those references are not binding on United States 
courts the way that a treaty is. 
33
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usage of foreign-law as confirmatory evidence for the Court‘s 
conclusions in the most obvious sense; the Court‘s mind is 
made up and the approbatory international law citation is just 
―icing on cakes that [the Court] insist[s] ha[s] already been 
baked.‖144 
Still, refusing to cite international or foreign legal 
developments would not only be intellectually disingenuous, 
but it would also rob United States courts of the transparency 
for which they are revered and appreciated worldwide.  The 
United States would be poorer for it, owing to a parochial 
perspective.145  Moreover, the relationships between United 
States law and the legal frameworks of other nations, 
especially on the crucial issues of human rights and torture, 
are symbiotic.  It simply cannot be that the time-tested Geneva 
Conventions, the UNCAT, and the judicial decisions of nations 
such as Israel, which confront terror threats daily, have no 
importance in American courts‘ analysis of torture‘s 
constitutionality.  Lord Atkins of the British Law Lords 
rejected automatic administrative detention during World War 
II146 and President Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court rejected 
the constitutionality of torture in ticking bomb scenarios147—
 
144. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 187 (2008).  
See also id. at 186 (the outrage against foreign legal citations in American 
federal courts may well be the product of jurisprudential ―antiglobalism‖ and 
―the evidently rising national anxiety about immigration, the outsourcing of 
important economic activities to businesses and employees overseas, and the 
decline of American prestige abroad in the wake of the Iraq war,‖ rather than 
any principled American exceptionalism in law). 
145. We might learn from the good and the bad in the practices and 
histories of other jurisdictions.  See generally Ginsburg, supra note 141; Kim 
Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for 
Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models, 1 INT‘L J. 
CONST. L. 296 (2003). 
146. See Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] 206 A.C. 244 (H.L.) (Atkins, L.J., 
dissenting) (―In this country amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent.  
They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.  
It has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of 
liberty for which we are now fighting, that the judges . . . stand between the 
subject and any attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive, 
alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law.‖). 
147. See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov‘t of Isr. 
[1999] IsrLR 36, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/ 
051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf (―This is the destiny of a democracy—it does not 
see all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open 
before it.  A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its 
back.  Even so, a democracy has the upper hand.  The rule of law and the 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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refuting Cicero‘s categorical statement that inter arma silent 
leges.148 
The need to learn from Israel—about the issue of balancing 
national security with constitutional ideals related to 
individual freedoms—should be obvious to American 
constitutional courts.  It is well-known that  
 
Israel finds itself in the middle of difficult battle 
against a furious wave of terrorism.  Israel is 
exercising its right of self defense.  This combat 
is not taking place in a normative void.  It is 
being carried out according to the rules of 
international law, which provide principles and 
rules for combat activity.149 
 
 Israeli jurists, who incessantly face the torture and terrorism 
questions, might know a thing or two.  It is not that American 
courts will necessarily agree with or find relevant Israeli 
judges‘ constructions of their own constitutional text on the 
torture question, but these constructions should be considered 
persuasive authority, establishing that the Supreme Court of a 
terrorism-challenged democratic state like Israel has not 
barred terrorism or torture challenges on justiciability 
grounds.150  The court has considered whether ―the state may 
 
liberty of an individual constitute important components in its understanding 
of security.‖).  See also HCJ 320/80 Kwasama v. Minister of Def. IsrSC 5(3) 
113, 132 (Cohen, J.) (―What distinguishes the war of the State from the war 
of its enemies is that the State fights while upholding the law, whereas its 
enemies fight while violating the law.  The moral strength and objective 
justness of the Government‘s war depend entirely on upholding the laws of 
the State: by conceding this strength and this justness, the Government 
serves the purposes of the enemy.‖). 
148. Latin for ―in battle, the laws are silent.‖  See CICERO, PRO MILONE 
16 (N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press, 5th ed. 1972). 
149. HCJ 3451/02 Almadani v. IDF Commander in Judea & Samaria 
[2002] IsrLR 5-6 (citation omitted), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ 
files_eng/02/510/034/a06/02034510.a06.pdf. 
150. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 293-94 (2006) 
(―We have not used the act of state doctrine or non-justiciability under these 
circumstances.  We consider these issues on their merits.  Nor do we require 
injury in fact as a standing requirement; we recognize the standing of anyone 
to challenge the act.  In the context of terrorism, the Israeli Supreme Court 
has ruled on petitions concerning the power of the state to arrest suspected 
terrorists and the conditions of their confinement.  It has ruled on petitions 
35
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forcibly relocate residents of an occupied territory who pose a 
threat to state security;‖151 how ―freedom and dignity of 
someone whom the state wishes to confine in administrative 
detention‖ might be ensured;152 the limited expertise of a court 
to inquire into military necessities;153 and whether torture is 
ever permissible (as preventive interrogation or as 
punishment).154 
To this last question, the Israeli Supreme Court responded 
with a resounding negative.  Such considerations go to the 
relevance of the available alternatives when a torture proposal 
is afoot.  They remain interspersed with the elephant in the 
 
concerning the rights of suspected terrorists to legal representation and the 
means by which they may be interrogated.‖ (citations omitted)). 
151. See HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002] 
IsrLR 33, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/150/070/ 
A15/02070150.a15.pdf (―A delicate and sensitive balance is required.  This is 
the price of democracy.  It is expensive, but worthwhile.  It strengthens the 
State.  It provides a reason for its struggle.‖).  See also HCJ 5973/92 Ass‘n for 
Civil Rights in Isr. v. Minister of Def. [1993], available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/92/730/059/Z01/92059730.z01.pdf 
(invalidating a deportation order devised without a proper hearing and due 
process and ordering a post-factum right to such a hearing). 
152. CrimA 7048/97 Anonymous v. Minister of Def. [2000] IsrLR 11, 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/97/480/070/a09/97070480.a 
09.pdf (―With that, there is no escape – in a freedom and security seeking 
democratic society – from the balancing of liberty and dignity and security.  
Human rights must not be turned into an axe for denying public and national 
security.  A balance is required – a delicate and difficult balance – between 
the liberty and the dignity of the individual and national security and public 
safety.  This balancing presumes – and in the petition before us the matter 
has not come up at all – that it is possible to enable – in a democratic freedom 
and security seeking state – the administrative detention of a person from 
whom a danger to national security is posed, but this possibility is not to be 
extended to the detention of a person from whom no danger is posed to 
national security and who merely constitutes a ‗bargaining chip.‘‖ (citations 
omitted)). 
153. HCJ 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank [2002] 
IsrSC, available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/150/070/a15/02070150.a15. 
pdf (―In exercising this judicial review, we do not appoint ourselves as experts 
in security matters.  We do not replace the security considerations of the 
military commander with our own security considerations.  We do not adopt 
any position with regard to the manner in which security matters are 
conducted.  Our role is to ensure that boundaries are not crossed and that the 
conditions that restrict the discretion of the military commander are upheld.‖ 
(citations omitted)). 
154. See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov‘t of Isr. 
[1999] IsrLR 11, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/051/ 
a09/94051000.a09.pdf. 
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courtroom: the institutional and jurisdictional competence of 
the Judicial Branch to decide questions involving national 
security.  Delineating between legal and constitutional 
questions (which are within judicial competence) and national 
security questions (which are not) is no easy feat, but the 
Israeli Supreme Court has navigated this minefield 
successfully.155  The Court has required proportionality of 
government need with action harming property and a due 
process hearing unless it interferes with imminent military 
necessity—occasionally permissible only as a preventive 
measure, not as collective retribution or punishment against 
the residents.156  Most notably, in Morcos v. Minister of 
Defence,157 the Tribunal invoked the equality principle in 
invalidating the disparate distribution of gas masks in the 
West Bank during the Gulf War.158  That case fell squarely 
within the judicial province and is a contemplative lesson of 
Wars on Terror universally. 
In this area, ―engaging foreign and international law may 
assist in questioning our own understanding of the [American] 
Constitution by . . .(1) comparing the consequences of different 
interpretive approaches, (2) clarifying ‗the distinctive function 
of one‘s own system;‘ and (3) illuminating the dimensions of the 
universal constitutional rights.‖159  Finally, since courts are 
 
155. See HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002] 
IsrLR 24, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/150/070/A15/ 
02070150.a15.pdf (―In exercising this judicial review, we do not appoint 
ourselves as experts in security matters.  We do not replace the security 
considerations of the military commander with our own security 
considerations.  We do not adopt any position with regard to the manner in 
which security matters are conducted.  Our role is to ensure that boundaries 
are not crossed and that the conditions that restrict the discretion of the 
military commander are upheld.‖ (citations omitted)). 
156. See HCJ 5510/92 Turkeman v. Minister of Def. [1993] IsrSC 48(1) 
217; see also DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 184-86 (2002). 
157. HCJ 168/91 [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 467. 
158. Id. at 470-71. 
159. Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the Debate on “Outsourcing 
Authority,” 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 658 n.34 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Vicki C. Jackson, Comment, Constitutional Comparisons: 
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 116-18 (2005)). 
See also Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 82, 87 (2004) (―From the suprapositive 
perspective, the interpretive value of international human rights norms and 
decisions derives from the normative insight that they provide.  The 
37
2010] TICKING-BOMB SCENARIO 581 
usually path-dependent to follow through with the logic of Case 
A to Cases B, C, D and so on, looking to the courts of another 
jurisdiction and anticipating the scope and range of cases likely 
to arise in one‘s own jurisdiction is not only prudent, but 
imperative.  It should not, for example, hurt American courts to 
envision the forms of interrogative techniques that the United 
Kingdom was accused of inflicting upon certain Irish 
Republican Army prisoners and to consider how the European 
Court of Human Rights reasoned through that dispute.160  The 
United States will lose influence on the world stage,161 if its 
federal judiciary declines to show ―a decent [r]espect to the 
[o]pinions of [human]kind.‖162  I will now move on to the 
histories of the Eighth Amendment and habeas corpus. 
 
 
interpreter should carefully examine whether the international conception of 
the right (or the feature at issue) rests primarily on consensual or 
institutional factors rather than on normative considerations, and whether 
its normative foundations are compatible with the basic assumptions of the 
U.S. constitutional system.‖). 
160. See Bell, supra note 23, at 345 (―1) [H]ooding at all times except 
during interrogation; 2) deprivation of sleep prior to interrogation; 3) holding 
the detainees prior to their interrogation in a room where there was a loud 
hissing sound; 4) wall-standing — that is, forcing detainees to stand against a 
wall for hours; and 5) subjecting detainees to reduced food and drink.‖ 
(referring to Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
25 (1978))). 
161. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (―The signature innovations of the American 
legal system — a written Constitution, a Bill of Rights protecting individual 
freedoms and an independent judiciary with the power to strike down 
legislation — have been consciously emulated in much of the world.  And 
American constitutional law has been cited and discussed in countless 
decisions of courts in Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, New 
Zealand, South Africa and elsewhere.‖); Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: 
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 114 
(2002) (―[M]ost justices of the United States Supreme Court do not cite 
foreign case law in their judgments.  They fail to make use of an important 
source of inspiration, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law more 
creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of different 
legal systems.‖). 
162. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (―When 
in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to 
dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to 
assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to 
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature‘s God entitle them, a decent Respect 
to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes 
which impel them to the Separation.‖). 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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II. History of the Eighth Amendment and Habeas Corpus: 
Applied to Citizens and Non-Citizens Alike 
 
Enacted December 16, 1689, the English Bill of Rights 
stated that ―excessive bail ought not to be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.‖163  Section 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
adopted the words verbatim.164  Subsequently, ―eight other 
states [(including Delaware,165 Maryland,166 New Hampshire,167 
North Carolina,168 Massachusetts,169 Pennsylvania,170 and 
 
163. 6 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, 1660-1774, at 122, 124 (Andrew 
Browning ed., 2d ed. 1996).  The English Bill of Rights characterized laws 
invading this guarantee as ―utterly and directly contrary to the known laws 
and statutes and freedom of this realm.‖  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 389 (1910). 
164. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 9, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3813 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) 
[hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
165. 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 569 (―Sec. 
11. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
punishments inflicted; and in the construction of jails a proper regard shall 
be had to the health of prisoners.‖). 
166. 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 1688 
(―XIV. That sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is consistent with 
the safety of the state; and no law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and 
penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter . . . . XXII. 
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel or unusual punishments inflicted, by the courts of law.‖). 
167. 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 2456-57 
(―XVIII. All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense. 
No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, 
forgery, and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason; where 
the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offense, the people 
are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit 
the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do those of the lightest 
dye.  For the same reason, a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic 
and unjust.  The true design of all punishments being to reform, not to 
exterminate, mankind . . . . XXXIII.  No magistrate or court of law shall 
demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or 
unusual punishments.‖). 
168. 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, 2788 
(generally prohibiting ―cruel or unusual punishments‖). 
169. 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 1892 
(―XXVI. No magistrate or court of law shall demand excessive bail or sureties, 
impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments.‖). 
170. 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 3101 (―Sec. 
13. That excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
39
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South Carolina171)] adopted the clause, the federal government 
inserted it into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,172 and it 
became the [E]ighth [A]mendment to the United States 
Constitution in 1791.‖173  In his concurring opinion in Furman 
v. Georgia, Justice William O. Douglas acknowledged that 
contemporary debates ―throw little light on its intended 
meaning‖.‖174  One constitutional scholar imputes the dearth of 
debate about the words ―cruel and unusual punishment‖—at 
both the First Congress and the state ratification 
conventions—to the intuition that, by the time of the Founding, 
the phrase had become ―constitutional boilerplate.‖175  This 
supposed lack of controversy about the meaning of ―cruel and 
unusual punishment‖ may suggest why the Supreme Court has 
not thought it necessary to evaluate the constitutionality of 
torture as punishment—that sentiment is encompassed by the 
very words of the Eighth Amendment. 
Of course, correlation is not equivalent to causation, and 
the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on torture cannot 
necessarily be assumed.  Nonetheless, repeated and identical 
assertions about English history throughout the chain of 
documents leading up to the Eighth Amendment make such a 
deduction textually clear and more than just inferential.176  
 
cruel punishments inflicted.‖). 
171. 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 3264 (―Sec. 
4. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
punishments inflicted.‖). 
172. U.S.C.A. Northwest Ordinance, art. II (1787). 
173. Granucci, supra note 88, at 840 (internal footnotes added).   
174. 408 U.S. 238, 244 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
175. Granucci, supra note 88, at 840 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
176. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 
(1947) (―Prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our 
law from the Bill of Rights of 1688.  The identical words appear in our Eighth 
Amendment.‖); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 394-95 (1910) (White, 
J., dissenting) (―The substantial identity between the provisions of these 
several constitutions or Bills of Rights shows beyond doubt that their 
meaning was understood; that is to say, that the significance attributed to 
them in the mother country as the result of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was 
appreciated, and that it was intended, in using the identical words, to give 
them the same well-understood meaning. . . . [T]he New Hampshire Bill of 
Rights contains a clause admonishing as to the wisdom of the apportionment 
of punishment of crime according to the nature of the offense, but in marked 
contrast to the re-enactment, in express and positive terms, of the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of the English Bill of Rights, the provision as to 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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They highlight that, at least in the real world, the Eighth 
Amendment does not merely demand proportionality between 
the crime committed and the punishment imposed, but also 
that certain absolute limitations govern.  The development of 
those limitations has followed the ―evolving standards,‖ 
constitutional-development approach.177  In addition to torture, 
those limitations include categorical prohibitions on the death 
penalty for certain types of crimes (non-homicidal person-on-
person crimes in the civilian context) and for certain classes of 
criminals (the mentally insane, the mentally retarded, and 
minors).  The English Bill of Rights concerned itself with the 
selective, random or irregular application of harsh penalties, 
and its goal was ―to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory 
penalties of a severe nature.‖178  Professor Anthony F. Granucci 
explains the history as follows: 
 
Following the Norman conquest of England 
in 1066, the old system of penalties, which 
ensured equality between crime and punishment, 
suddenly disappeared.  By the time systematic 
judicial records were kept, its demise was almost 
complete.  With the exception of certain grave 
crimes for which the punishment was death or 
outlawry, the arbitrary fine was replaced by a 
discretionary amercement.  Although 
amercement‘s discretionary character allowed 
the circumstances of each case to be taken into 
account and the level of cash penalties to be 
decreased or increased accordingly, the 
amercement presented an opportunity for 
excessive or oppressive fines. 
The problem of excessive amercements 
became so prevalent that three chapters of the 
Magna Carta were devoted to their regulation.  
Maitland said of Chapter 14 that ―very likely 
 
apportionment is merely advisory, additionally demonstrating the precise 
and accurate conception then entertained of the nature and character of the 
prohibition adopted from the English Bill of Rights.‖). 
177. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
178. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
41
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there was no clause in the Magna Carta more 
grateful to the mass of the people.‖  Chapter 14 
clearly stipulated as fundamental law a 
prohibition of excessiveness in punishments: A 
free man shall not be amerced for a trivial 
offence, except in accordance with the degree of 
the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be 
amerced according to its gravity . . . .179 
 
 From the debates of the First Congress, we observe the 
following exchange: 
 
Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, objected to the 
words ‗―nor cruel and unusual punishments;‘‖ the 
import of them being too indefinite. 
 
Mr. LIVERMORE[:] The clause seems to express 
a great deal of humanity, on which account I 
have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no 
meaning in it, I do not think it necessary.  What 
is meant by the terms excessive bail?  Who are to 
be the judges?  What is understood by excessive 
fines?  It lies with the court to determine.  No 
cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; 
it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains 
often deserve whipping, and perhaps having 
their ears cut off; but are we in future to be 
prevented from inflicting these punishments 
because they are cruel?  If a more lenient mode of 
correcting vice and deterring others from the 
commission of it could be invented, it would be 
very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but 
until we have some security that this will be 
done, we ought not to be restrained from making 
necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.180 
 
At the Massachusetts convention, debating over the Eighth 
 
179. Granucci, supra note 88, at 845-46 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
180. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
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Amendment, Mr. Holmes protested: 
 
What gives an additional glare of horror to these 
gloomy circumstances is the consideration that 
Congress have to ascertain, point out, and 
determine, what kind of punishments shall be 
inflicted on persons convicted of crimes.  They 
are nowhere restrained from inventing the most 
cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing 
them to crimes; and there is no constitutional 
check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be 
amongst the most mild instruments of their 
discipline.181 
 
 Holmes‘s view, therefore, was that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause imposed a restraint on Congress‘s right to 
create punishments for federal crimes.  The concern was also 
about legislative power, since the new government created by 
the Constitution precluded, through a prohibition on the bill of 
attainder and other procedural protections, convictions and 
punishments by Executive fiat.  On the other front, Livermore 
―favored rejection of the [A]mendment because of his fear of 
what later generations might make of it.‖182  However, even 
though elasticity means both enhancement and retrenchment 
of protections, I have explained why in constitutional terms the 
latter is usually unacceptable.  Indeed, the Livermore view 
suggesting rejection did not prevail, but of course the second 
prong of the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis asks 
whether less drastic punitive alternatives are available.  Apart 
from this, certain categorical prohibitions are also observed in 
the natural course of evolving societal standards.183  The 
Framers‘ prohibition on ―torturous punishments‖ does not 
demand the inference that only such punishments were 
outlawed by the Clause; it does, however, demand the inference 
 
181. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888). 
182. Heffernan, supra note 74, at 1390. 
183. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: 
Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 278 (2003); Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the 
Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 666-680 (2004). 
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that torture per se was outlawed by the Clause.  The fear that 
the legislature would have unlimited power to prescribe 
punishments was stated by Patrick Henry at the Virginia 
convention for ratification of the Eighth Amendment: 
 
Congress, from their general powers, may fully 
go into business of human legislation.  They may 
legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the 
lowest offence — petty larceny.  They may define 
crimes and prescribe punishments.  In the 
definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed 
by what wise representatives ought to be 
governed by.  But when we come to punishments, 
no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put 
on the virtue of representatives.  What says our 
[Virginia] bill of rights? — ―that excessive bail 
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.‖  Are you not, therefore, now calling on 
those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to  
. . . define punishments without this control?  
Will they find sentiments there similar to this 
bill of rights?  You let them loose; you do more — 
you depart from the genius of your country. . . . 
. . . . 
In this business of legislation, your members 
of Congress will loose the restriction of not 
imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive 
bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual 
punishments.  These are prohibited by your 
[Virginia] declaration of rights.  What has 
distinguished our ancestors? — That they would 
not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous 
punishment.184  
 
Henry then added: 
 
But Congress may introduce the practice of the 
 
184. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888). 
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civil law, in preference to that of the common 
law.  They may introduce the practice of France, 
Spain, and Germany — of torturing, to extort a 
confession of the crime.185 
 
Echoing the earlier point about the privilege against self-
incrimination working in tandem with the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 
 
Mr. George Mason [of Virginia] replied that the 
worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion 
that the bill of rights did not prohibit torture; for 
that one clause expressly provided that no man 
can give evidence against himself . . . .  Another 
clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel 
and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; 
therefore, torture was included in the 
prohibition.186  
 
 The Eighth Amendment, of course, would be applied to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Starting with the 
First Principles, irrespective of whether the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause is applied to the States through the Due 
Process or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the effect is the same.  Congressman 
Henry H. Bingham, when proposing the Fourteenth 
Amendment, maintained that ―the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States,‖ as protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, included protection against ―cruel and unusual 
punishments‖: 
 
[M]any instances of State injustice and 
oppression have already occurred in the State 
legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of 
the guarantied privileges of citizens of the 
United States, for which the national 
Government furnished and could furnish by law 
no remedy whatever.  Contrary to the express 
 
185. Id. at 447-48. 
186. Id. at 452. 
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letter of your Constitution, ―cruel and unusual 
punishments‖ have been inflicted under State 
laws within this Union upon citizens, not only for 
crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for 
which and against which the Government of the 
United States had provided no remedy and could 
provide none.187  
 
 We now arrive at the issue of equal protection of the laws 
in the national security setting.  What of the difference in 
treatment between citizens and non-citizens?  The 
Constitution, according to text or history, does not seem to 
permit a lesser degree of scrutiny for torture upon non-
citizens.188  ―Under the Business as Usual model of emergency 
powers, a state of emergency does not justify a deviation from 
the ‗normal‘ legal system.‖189  To date, the Supreme Court has 
approved of distinctions between citizens and non-citizens that 
bear a stronger affinity to matters of government jobs and 
other privileges as opposed to matters of right.  Such privileges 
are few and far between and the government may reasonably 
prefer citizens over non-citizens in some cases.190  But these 
privileges are worlds-apart from criminal law questions so 
central to an individual‘s life, liberty and dignity.  Here 
―selective and targeted infliction of punishments as serious as 
those dispensed by a criminal trial upon [those] without 
political potency (exercised through the franchise) registers 
equal-protection concerns.‖191  Boumediene v. Bush192 and 
 
187. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). 
188. See generally Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1071 (L. Levy & K. Karst eds., 1986). 
189. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises 
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1043 (2003). 
190. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.22 (1976) 
(non-citizens as a ―class . . . suffer special disabilities‖); Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U.S. 634 (1973) (government may not restrict ordinary civil servant jobs 
to citizens); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state may not exclude 
persons from law practice just because they are non-citizens); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (―[C]lassifications based on alienage . . . 
are . . . subject to close judicial scrutiny.‖).  See also Michael C. Dorf, Equal 
Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951 (2002). 
191. Dasgupta, supra note 56, at 444.  See also id. at 445 (―It is difficult 
to reconcile the Constitution‘s equality instruction as the ‗salvation‘ against 
inequities with . . .  weak enforcement of that constitutional guarantee 
(especially when the group singled out for unique treatment (in this case 
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Guantanamo Bay do not provide the only context in which 
habeas corpus has been suspended in this country.193  However, 
this recent scenario has breathtaking dimensions because of 
the citizen-noncitizen distinction, mirroring in many respects 
the Japanese internment during World War II (based on 
ancestry and race).  Like the Israeli Supreme Court‘s Morcos 
decision insisting on equality for gas mask distribution, 
American courts, during the current War on Terror (and 
presumably we define the ―War on Terror‖ that broadly), must 
not stop policing the protection of individuals‘ rights. 
Sovereigns have a duty to govern impartially and 
neutrally, in observance of Justice Coke‘s centuries-old 
admonition to King James I that ―quod Rex non debet esse sub 
homine, sed sub Deo et lege.‖194  The word ―neutrality‖ has 
widely been used by the United States Supreme Court to 
describe the role of the government in such situations.  In 
Romer v. Evans, the Court spoke of the government‘s 
constitutional ―[pre-]commitment to the law‘s neutrality where 
 
foreigners) lacks even the political agency to make waves electorally).  If 
legislative changes cannot be made by the aggrieved group through 
democratic means, then the doctrinal foundation of the judicial restraint 
philosophy suffers a setback.‖).  Even though we do not live in a system of 
parliamentary supremacy and instead in a regime where a written 
constitution allows the judiciary to question the legality of the actions of both 
the executive and the legislature, Congress has shown itself amenable to 
respecting the human dignity of persons in many cases.  See, e.g., Ledbetter 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), overruled by statute, 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), overruled, in part, by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality); 1 BARBARA 
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2 (3d ed. 
1996) (―A spate of Court decisions in the late 1980s drew congressional fire 
and resulted in demands for legislative change [culminating in the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act].‖ (footnote omitted)). 
192. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
193. See, e.g., Justia.com, U.S. Supreme Court Center, http://supreme. 
justia.com/constitution/article-1/51-habeas-corpus-suspension.html (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2009) (―The privilege of the Writ was suspended in nine 
counties in South Carolina in order to combat the Ku Klux Klan, pursuant to 
Act of April 20, 1871, 4, 17 Stat. 14.  It was suspended in the Philippines in 
1905, pursuant to the Act of July 1, 1902, 5, 32 Stat. 692.  Finally, it was 
suspended in Hawaii during World War II, pursuant to a section of the 
Hawaiian Organic Act, 67, 31 Stat. 153 (1900).‖ (citations omitted)). 
194. Latin for ―the king is not subject to man, but subject to God and the 
law.‖ 
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the rights of persons are at stake.‖195  This echoed Justice 
Stevens‘ earlier assertion, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, that constitutional constraints on government 
conduct ―include[d] elements of legitimacy and neutrality that 
must always characterize the performance of the sovereign‘s 
duty to govern impartially.‖196  Invalidating a private litigant‘s 
use of gender in a peremptory challenge and holding it to a 
presumptively unconstitutional criterion, Justice Kennedy, in 
J.E.B. v. Alabama, also invoked the same word.197  Alienage or 
non-citizen status may well have to be used as a distinguishing 
factor, but never as a pretext or without an ―exceedingly 
persuasive justification.‖198 
Even if the Court cannot or is unprepared to apply de facto 
strict scrutiny to such classifications, the Court should 
expressly remove them from rational basis-land.  If not strict 
scrutiny, then some form of heightened scrutiny is necessary.  
Under existing case law, the deprivation of constitutional 
rights in criminal or detention law (including the freedom from 
torture) would be tantamount to fencing out of the judicial 
process those who already are excluded from the political 
process (at least through suffrage).  Setting up a lenient torture 
warrant procedure or allowing torture altogether for non-
citizens would penalize ―millions of green card holders and five 
billion people across the planet‖ and slot them ―into a category 
that enables a different, and far inferior . . . procedure than 
what American citizens face.‖199  Torture is not a situation 
where differential treatment based on alienage qualifies as a 
―plausible reason[ ],‖200 at least not a constitutionally justifiable 
 
195. 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
196. 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
197. 511 U.S. 127, 153 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
198. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Miss. 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
199. Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 
1367 (2007) (in these circumstances, ―standard checks on government abuse, 
such as political accountability, fail to operate‖).  See also JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 161-62 (1980); 
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court: 1990 Term — Foreword: 
Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 92-93 (1991). 
200. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).  See also 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (―The Constitution presumes that, 
absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will 
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one. 
Irrespective of what constitutes ―torture‖ and how sound 
that definition might be, it only means something if the right to 
be free from torture can be vindicated in court.  Therefore, the 
right not to be tortured shares an important connection with 
habeas corpus itself.  Under the Constitution, an individual‘s 
right to ―the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, 
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety‖ so requires.201  Without habeas corpus, the government 
has no obligation, and the accused no right, to have the facts 
tried in court.  In the history of habeas corpus, we first 
encounter the infamous Darnel‟s Case in Stuart England.202  
That dispute arose from King Charles I‘s decision to issue a 
warrant to arrest those who refused to become his creditors.  
Public disapproval rising, the House of Commons rapidly 
enacted the Petition of Right,203 reproving such 
―imprison[ment] without any cause,‖ and proclaimed that ―no 
freeman in any such manner as is before mencioned [shall] be 
imprisoned or deteined.‖204  Later, the Habeas Corpus Acts of 
1640 and 1679 provided individuals a right to have their 
imprisonment (through the order or warrant of the Privy 
Council or the monarch herself) questioned by an impartial 
court.  After the tense period of interregnum, Parliament 
stipulated procedures governing access to habeas relief.205  It is 
fair to say that ―[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas 
 
eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial 
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think 
a political branch has acted.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 2. 
202. Darnel‘s Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B. 1627). 
203. See 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (1627) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE 
REALM 23-24 (1810). 
204. Id. at 24. 
205. This Act, which William Blackstone later considered the ―second 
magna carta, and stable bulwark of our liberties,‖ served as the paradigm for 
the habeas laws of the original thirteen American colonies.  See WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 137 (Adamant Media, 
2000).  See also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137; Rex A. Collings, 
Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts — Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace, 
40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 338-39 (1952).  Moreover, THE FEDERALIST No. 84 
(Alexander Hamilton), explained the writ of habeas corpus, the only common 
law writ appearing in the United States Constitution, as ―the practice of 
arbitrary imprisonments‖ and ―in all ages, the favorite and most formidable 
instruments of tyranny.‖ 
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corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of 
executive detention, and it is in that context that its 
protections have been strongest.‖206 
Remarkably, the New York state convention considering 
the ratification of the Constitution in July 1788 noted: 
 
[E]very Person restrained of his Liberty is 
entitled to an enquiry into the lawfulness of such 
restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful; 
and that such enquiry or removal ought not to be 
denied or delayed, except when, on account of 
Public Danger, the Congress shall suspend the 
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.207  
 
Notice the choice in diction.  ―The word ‗person,‘ as opposed to 
the more limiting term ‗citizen,‘ informs the universal 
character of the privilege, irrespective of the [tortured or 
interrogated person‘s] citizenship status.‖208  What else can we 
infer?  Perhaps we can infer that the reasoning behind the 
otherwise-salutary theory of judicial restraint falls apart when 
the group singled out for a disfavor lacks the political 
wherewithal to hold accountable those legislators and that 
President whom they could not oust through elections because 
they had no suffrage in our polity.  Textually, too, the 
Constitution does not favor such distinctions.  The adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause 
extended to state action a requirement that the government 
may not arbitrarily discriminate against some persons in 
preference to others; this obligation had already been imposed 
upon the Federal Government through the Fifth Amendment‘s 
Due Process Clause.  Justice Robert H. Jackson advanced a 
theory of judicial review whose fons et origo was the 
government‘s (and associatively, society‘s) enforcement of 
equality: ―Courts can take no better measure to assure that 
laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in 
 
206. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). 
207. Resolution of the New York Ratifying Convention (July 26, 1788), 
reprinted in 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888) 
(emphasis added). 
208. Dasgupta, supra note 56, at 444. 
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operation.‖209 
The argument runs that the political process will not allow 
(or will respond with a backlash to) arbitrary, capricious and 
generally undesirable inconveniences when those 
inconveniences are distributed evenly throughout society.  No 
one or two groups will disproportionately suffer.  As Professor 
Louis Henkin points out, ―[t]he choice in the Bill of Rights of 
the word ‗person‘ rather than ‗citizen‘ was not fortuitous; nor 
was the absence of a geographical limitation.  [It] reflect[s] a 
commitment to respect the individual rights of all human 
beings.‖210 Same with the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Amendment was initially drafted to forbid state action 
discriminating between ―persons because of race, color or 
previous condition of servitude[,]‖ and instead, it went on to 
prohibit, in sweeping terms, such discrimination against ―any 
person within its jurisdiction.‖211  Henkin‘s view, publicly 
endorsed by at least one Member of the present Supreme 
Court, is that ―[w]herever the United States acts, it can only 
act in accordance with the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.‖212 
In the field of national security, where courts give the 
political Branches the most deference, even the war power is 
 
209. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (―[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty 
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be 
imposed generally.  Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so 
effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom 
they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that 
might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.‖). 
210. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 139 (1990).  This phrase ―the 
People‖ has repeatedly been used in the Constitution‘s text as conceptually 
different from the phrase ―persons.‖  The former refers to the polity and the 
citizenry, in whose name the governments, both of the United States and of 
the several states, exist.  ―Persons‖ refers to individuals whose rights are 
protected and defended by some parts of the original Constitution, most of 
the Bill of Rights, and several of the Amendments. 
211. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 151 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).  Of course, it is the Fifth 
Amendment and not the Fourteenth that limits the reach of federal official 
action.  Nevertheless, the inference is noteworthy because the Fourteenth 
Amendment was modeled upon and incorporated the Bill of Rights. 
212. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Tribute to Louis Henkin, 38 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 467, 468 (2007). 
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governed by ―applicable constitutional limitations.‖213 ―[I]n 
times of war or of perceived threats from abroad, civil liberties 
have been compromised by actions of the Congress or the 
president that were upheld by the courts.‖214  The Framers 
were brave and visionary statesmen, and they outright forbade 
torture—indeed it is clear that even if they could not define 
what a ―cruel and unusual punishment‖ might necessarily look 
like, they did typify torture as such.  However, their challenges 
were not of a nuclear-scale, as they are now, so ending the 
constitutional inquiry there would be extrapolating history out 
of context.215  This should not provide license to silence our 
supreme domestic laws and international jus cogens; rather, it 
should be an invitation to work within the laws.216 
 
III. Why Qualified Immunity (Ironically) Helps the ‗Torture 
Warrant‘ Argument 
 
Even if we review an incident of torture after-the-fact with 
 
213. Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 
(1919). 
214. Morton H. Halperin, National Security, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS 
281 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1984). 
215. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, First Conference on Computers, 
Freedom & Privacy: The Constitution in Cyperspace (Mar. 26, 1991) (pre-
conference paper available at 
http://cpsr.org/prevsite/conferences/cfp91/tribe2.html/) (stating that ―the 
Framers of our Constitution were . . . profoundly wise.  They bequeathed us a 
framework for all seasons, a truly astonishing document whose basic 
principles . . . are suitable for all times and all technological landscapes‖). 
216. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME SILENCE DURING WAR, at 1-2 
n.4 (2004), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83449_index.html; HCJ 168/91 
Morcos v. Minister of Def. [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 467, 470-71 (―When the cannons 
speak, the Muses are silent.  But even when the cannons speak, the military 
commander must uphold the law.  The power of society to stand up against 
its enemies is based on its recognition that it is fighting for values that 
deserve protection.  The rule of law is one of these values.‖); HCJ 428/86 
Barzilai v. Gov‘t of Israel [1986] IsrLR 140 (―[F]or there is no security without 
law, and the rule of law is a component of national security.  Security needs 
dictate that the proper investigative machinery be found, or else the General 
Security Service will be unable to fulfill its task.  The strength of the Service 
lies in the public confidence it enjoys, in the trust placed in it by the court.  If 
security interests become the paramount consideration, the public as well as 
the court will lose their trust in the Security Service and in the legality of its 
operations.  Without trust, the State authorities cannot function.  That is the 
case with the public trust in the courts, and so it is with the public trust in 
the other governmental organs.‖ (citation omitted)). 
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tremendous deference to the instantaneous decision that had to 
be made, purely invidious criteria, such as unconstitutional 
discrimination or disparate impact (conscious or not), could 
well have injected themselves into the torturer‘s decision.  The 
standard for qualified immunity has gradually been bent so 
favorably towards the government officials allegedly causing 
constitutional violations, and has put such an extraordinary 
burden on plaintiffs, that it no longer works in most situations.  
That is to say that qualified immunity is almost always 
granted, and therefore, it has stopped serving as a post-hoc 
deterrent.  In effect, the current frequency of qualified 
immunity approval (by the Supreme Court to government 
officers accused of violating persons‘ legal rights) compels us to 
think of more workable alternatives to control how often and 
how inaccurately torture is imposed in ticking-bomb scenarios.  
Torture warrants remain a feasible pre-trial and 
preventive interrogation alternative.  A recent example should 
be illustrative.  The United States Supreme Court‘s Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal217 decision has received less coverage (both in the media 
and scholarship) than it should be receiving.  Iqbal and its 
precursors render it likely that officials accused of torturing or 
otherwise violating the constitutional rights of those detainees 
who were rounded up immediately after September 11, 2001, 
will enjoy qualified immunity.  The facts and claims addressed 
in Iqbal are notable.218  Because the detainees were primarily 
 
217. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
218. The Iqbal Court noted: 
 
The complaint contends that petitioners designated 
respondent a person of high interest on account of his race, 
religion, or national origin, in contravention of the First and 
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.  The complaint 
alleges that ―the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant 
Mueller [then-Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)], arrested and detained thousands of 
Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the 
events of September 11.‖  It further alleges that ―[t]he policy 
of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly 
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were 
‗cleared‘ by the FBI was approved by Defendants Ashcroft 
[then-Attorney General of the United States] and Mueller in 
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.‖  Lastly, 
the complaint posits that petitioners ―each knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject‖ 
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Arabs and Muslims, discrimination claims were included.  The 
governing statutory provision is Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint must 
contain a ―short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.‖  The law‘s ―constitutive 
principle[s]‖ are that the rules must, at a minimum, be 
transformative, accountable, and prospective.219  Because Rule 
8 states an implied cause of action (unquestionably raising 
important ―separation of powers concerns‖),220 it is presumed to 
be a ―federal analog to suits brought against state officials 
under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983.‖221 
Despite the due process arguments involving Mathews, 
Sandin, and Wilkinson (recited in Part I), the Iqbal Court 
raised the standard of pleading so high that it may be arguably 
insurmountable in cases involving similar torture scenarios.  
Iqbal thus makes clear that officials will, more likely than not, 
receive the benefit of the doubt and thus receive qualified 
immunity.  Rule 8, the Court said, ―does not require ‗detailed 
factual allegations,‘ but it demands more than an unadorned, 
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.‖222  Such 
specific evidence is hard to come by in situations where a 
torturee does not know the names of the perpetrators; 
sometimes all a plaintiff will know is the supervisor‘s name 
and identity.  Raising the Rule 8 threshold so high effectively 
 
respondent to harsh conditions of confinement ―as a matter 
of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or 
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.‖  
The pleading names Ashcroft as the ―principal architect‖ of 
the policy, and identifies Mueller as ―instrumental in [its] 
adoption, promulgation, and implementation.‖ 
 
Id. at 1944 (citations omitted). 
219. See LUC B. TREMBLAY, THE RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE, AND 
INTERPRETATION 150-55 (1997). 
220. See, e.g., Ryan D. Newman, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: 
Implied Constitutional Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 471, 473 (2006). 
221. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254-55 n.2 (2006).  See also 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). 
222. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (―A pleading that offers ‗labels and 
conclusions‘ or ‗a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 
not do.‘  Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked ‗assertion[s]‘ devoid 
of further factual enhancement.‖ (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007))). 
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bars these cases from federal court. 
Notwithstanding Rule 8‘s prescription that a plaintiff‘s 
factual allegations must be taken to be true, Iqbal rejected the 
plaintiff‘s allegations that the government defendants ―agreed 
to subject him to harsh conditions as a matter of policy, solely 
on account of discriminatory factors and for no legitimate 
penological interest; that [the then-Attorney General of the 
United States] was that policy‘s ‗principal architect‘; and that 
[the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)] was 
‗instrumental‘ in its adoption and execution . . . .‖223  Such a 
standard makes it likelier that the torturer will employ torture 
whenever she has some doubt, and it gives fruition to the 
prophecy that the government ―might come to rely on torture to 
avert attacks‖: ―legalizing torture in high evidence cases can 
reduce security and increase agency incentives to torture even 
in low evidence cases, leading to a ‗slippery slope.‘‖224 
 
A. Applying Qualified Immunity 
 
The pivotal Supreme Court decision Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics225 held 
that implied causes of action exist to protect against federal 
officials‘ violations of the Fourth Amendment (protecting 
against unreasonable searches and seizures).226  Bivens 
―recognized for the first time an implied private action for 
damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a 
citizen‘s constitutional rights.‖227  As an implied cause of 
action, Bivens has been the target of enormous criticism (for 
allegedly anti-democratic judicial law-making).228  Individuals 
 
223. Id. at 1941. 
224. Hugo M. Mialon, Sue H. Mialon & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe, An 
Economic Analysis of Torture in Counterterrorism 1 (Dec. 12, 2008) 
(unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268441. 
225. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
226. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979) (holding that a 
congressional employee may bring a Bivens action against a former 
congressman for a Fifth Amendment violation); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 
14, 19-20 (1980) (holding that a deceased federal prisoner may be entitled to 
a Bivens action under the Eighth Amendment). 
227. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). 
228. See, e.g., Carlson, 446 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (―In my 
view, it is ‗an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give us‘ for this 
Court to infer a private civil damages remedy from the Eighth Amendment or 
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victimized by the denial of this right may sue for the infraction 
of the Fourth Amendment itself, despite the absence of any 
federal statute expressly authorizing such a suit.229 
The presumption was that an automatic remedy for the 
violation derives from the history and magnitude of the right 
violated, and that the cause of action fails to attach only when 
Congress disabuses the courts from applying such a remedy.230  
Here the default understanding is in favor of a federal law 
remedy since constitutional abuses require special 
enforcement, which is not necessarily appropriate for violations 
of federal positive law.  In Saucier v. Katz,231 and other cases, 
however, the Court has qualified Bivens by using the vehicle of 
qualified immunity.232 The qualified immunity doctrine states 
that if the government defendant violated a constitutional right 
 
any other constitutional provision.‖ (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 428 (Black, 
J., dissenting))).  
 
We would more surely preserve the important values of the 
doctrine of separation of powers — and perhaps get a better 
result — by recommending a solution to the Congress as the 
branch of government in which the Constitution has vested 
the legislative power.  Legislation is the business of the 
Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that 
task — as we do not. 
 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
229. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
230. See id. at 396-97.  Some scholars would openly truncate Congress‘ 
right to limit the causes of action, and they therefore do not bemoan the lack 
of Congress‘ express validation.  However, that step would be precipitous and 
would amount to cutting off a budding dialogue with a coordinate branch.  
See, e.g., George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs – 
Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 294-95 (1989) 
(asserting that because Bivens protects constitutional rights, less deference to 
Congress is required than in other cases); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and 
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1540-43 
(1972) (analogizing federal statutes with the Constitution and arguing that 
courts should infer remedies constitutionally as they do statutorily); Gene R. 
Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 
1117, 1153 (1989) (recognizing implied constitutional remedies as an 
essential aspect of federal judicial oversight); Joan Steinman, Backing Off 
Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First 
Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269, 297-302 (1984) (arguing that 
Bivens remedies should also apply to the First Amendment). 
231. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
232. See, e.g., id.; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
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that was not clearly established when the right was violated, 
then the official remains immune from suit.233  The qualified 
immunity defense is synonymous with the Model Penal Code‘s 
necessity defense.234  This is the background of the post-torture 
scenario. 
The pre-torture configuration, however, goes to the merit 
of a torture warrant: it might actually aid the suspect.  
Requiring the government to receive a torture warrant from a 
judge will ensure that the suspect retains some realistic chance 
of averting torture in the face of Executive fiat.  An impartial 
arbiter, better situated in the moment, with 20-20 vision of the 
situation, is more capable of assessing the imminent need for 
torture than is the actual torturer.  The deference I propose is a 
hybrid of Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles and 
the qualified immunity decisional law governing official 
conduct in hindsight.  Qualified immunity, to be prospective 
and fair to the parties, requires: (1) that the reviewing 
standard be de novo and the reviewing court consider a district 
court‘s rejection of qualified immunity if the question turns on 
a legal point; (2) that a constitutional violation subject to 
Bivens federal actions be a matter of clearly established law; 
(3) that the personal involvement of the defendants be alleged 
and proven; and (4) that the pleading standard be such that a 
complaint ―give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the 
 
233. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01.  Such cases include torture, discrete 
acts of discrimination, and other government behavior forbidden by the 
Constitution.  Bivens is federal common law; Congress has not eviscerated its 
central holding.  See, e.g., Riddhi Dasgupta, Bivens in the War on Terror: 
Scope for the Supreme Court in its Upcoming Case, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 
397, 411-12 (2009)  (―The Supreme Court deconstructed the qualified 
immunity inquiry into two parts: first, to determine whether the facts 
indicate and prove that a government defendant violated another‘s 
constitutional rights; and second, if indeed the defendant did do so, then was 
the constitutional right thus violated ‗clearly established‘ at the time of the 
government official‘s infraction? . . .  [T]he dilemma lies on the prongs of an 
ex ante versus ex post judicial inquiry over whether the defendant is entitled 
to qualified immunity.‖ (citation omitted)); Jon O. Newman, Suing the 
Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for 
Law Enforcers‟ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 460 (1978).  Absent legislation 
by Congress, the Court weighs statutory stare decisis heavily. 
234. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02.  See also Goldberg, supra note 37, at 17 
(―The Model Code rejects any limitations on necessity cast in terms of 
particular evils to be avoided or particular evils to be justified.‖). 
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plaintiff‘s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‖235 
The hurdle a court must clear before reaching the merits is 
the pleading standard.236  Constitutional rights violations are 
not the only context where pleading standards are used as a 
procedural roadblock.237 Prior cases require litigants to satisfy 
the ―notice‖ pleading requirements, providing fair and 
adequate notice to their opponents regarding the claim and its 
supporting grounds.238  Rule 8 requires that the complaint 
―contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all 
the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under 
some viable legal theory.‖239  And even though courts must 
―give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to 
be drawn from well-pleaded facts,‖240 they are not required to 
accept as true conclusory allegations, legal characterizations, 
unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact.241  
 
235. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  The court ―must take all the well 
pleaded allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.‖  Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 665 
(3d Cir. 1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (referring to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
236. In an earlier article previewing Ashcroft v. Iqbal‘s deliberation in 
the Supreme Court, I predicted: ―Even though this article does not delve 
significantly into the issue of pleading standards that may be the frontier 
where the battle for qualified immunity is decided.  Allowing the case to go 
through those gates, or cutting off its movement, might make all the 
difference.‖  Dasgupta, supra note 233, at 418.  While accepting that Iqbal‘s 
First Amendment claims might be meritorious, by raising the pleadings 
standards the Court gave the high-ranking officials immunity from monetary 
damages. 
237. Securities law is another such context.  See Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (―[O]rdinary pleading rules are not meant to impose 
a great burden on a plaintiff.  But it should not prove burdensome for a 
plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some 
indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind. 
. . .  [A]llowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indication of the economic loss 
and proximate cause would bring about harm of the very sort the statutes 
seek to avoid.‖) (citations omitted)). 
238. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512; Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
239. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 
(7th Cir. 1984)).  Courts of Appeals have applied this test with some success.  
See, e.g., Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006); Snow 
v. Directv, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006). 
240. Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1998). 
241. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
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All of these pleading requirements are on top of the fact that 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already 
provides for pretrial procedures to bar frivolous or other 
patently unmeritorious and vexatious claims.242 
It follows that a heightened pleading standard might doom 
the torturee‘s money damages suit: due to the unusual 
circumstances and lack of specific knowledge during his prison 
confinement, his allegations do not decisively pinpoint when 
the alleged conduct took place, who the actors were, or what 
the locations were.243  Especially when, as in Bivens, no 
criminal charges have been filed, a torturee has no remedy to 
recover other than money damages.  In Iqbal, although the 
defendant was convicted of criminal charges, there is no other 
remedy for the plaintiff to pursue other than damages in a 
Bivens action—nothing else can make him whole or 
compensate him for the alleged violations of his constitutional 
rights (namely, the First and Fifth Amendments).  The 
government-defendants would prefer a high pleading 
threshold, which would likely keep the merits of the case out of 
federal court (due to Twombly, or Iqbal itself).  The torturee‘s 
allegations would likely be found insufficiently detailed.  
Sometimes, federal courts of appeal ―review the district court‘s 
denial de novo, accepting as true the material facts alleged in 
the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in 
plaintiffs‘ favor.‖244  This civil procedure rule is germane when 
 
242. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Rule 
16 invests a trial judge with the power, backed by sanctions, to regulate 
pretrial proceedings via conferences and scheduling orders, at which the 
parties may discuss, inter alia, ‗the elimination of frivolous claims or 
defenses,‘ Rule 16(c)(1); ‗the necessity or desirability of amendments to the 
pleadings,‘ Rule 16(c)(2); ‗the control and scheduling of discovery,‘ Rule 
16(c)(6); and ‗the need for adopting special procedures for managing 
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, 
multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems,‘ Rule 
16(c)(12).‖). 
243. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the 
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 924-26 (2009) (identifying 
various forms of information asymmetry with respect to costs and facts—
including ―informed plaintiffs and uninformed defendants‖ and ―uninformed 
plaintiffs and informed defendants‖—as a primary cause of meritless suits; 
regulatory responses and gatekeeping rules must be calibrated, and, if 
necessary, recalibrated, to measure up to the task). 
244.  Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
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a district court rejects a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 
suit and denies a qualified immunity motion. 
Supreme Court precedent, viz. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
provides that when a federal district court denies a motion for 
qualified immunity, ―to the extent that it turns on an issue of 
law,‖ its judgment is ―an appealable ‗final decision.‘‖245  
Mitchell expressed the flip side to the plaintiff‘s argument that 
she should be made whole after her suffering: specifically, the 
government defendants‘ defense is that they were following the 
law as it existed at the time and which they had had no good-
faith reason to believe would change in the middle of the game.  
Since qualified immunity, much like absolute immunity, is 
after all a right not to stand trial, such a right of the officers is 
violated if a false-start case goes to trial incorrectly.246  Courts 
have held that ―[q]ualified immunity is an immunity from suit 
and not just a defense to liability.‖247  Thus, a decision 
prejudicing this right might be reversed or vacated on an 
interlocutory appeal.248  The federal statutory provision, 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, does not require the case to come to an end or for 
a ―final judgment‖ to be entered such that the district court‘s 
denial of qualified immunity can be reviewed on appeal.249  As 
soon as a federal district court finds that a plaintiff‘s factual 
allegations are true, a reviewing court is empowered to 
determine if the facts point towards allegedly unconstitutional 
conduct and infringe upon a right clearly established at the 
time of the violation. 
In Johnson v. Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that 
interlocutory appeals raising qualified immunity as a defense 
are permitted to the extent that they seek review of legal, as 
opposed to factual, questions.250  Facts are within the 
jurisdiction of the court of original jurisdiction, and a very high 
burden must be met before factual conclusions are reversed.  
Johnson thus restricted the effect of Anderson v. Creighton, 
which provided that plaintiffs must demonstrate some factual 
similarities between constitutional holdings and officers‘ 
 
245. 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)). 
246. Id. at 526 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)). 
247. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d. Cir. 2007). 
248. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528-29. 
249. Id. at 530. 
250. 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995). 
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alleged violations.251  Similarly, the Court in Hope v. Pelzer 
refused to hold that unconstitutional government acts must be 
―materially similar‖ to acts that already have been held 
unconstitutional.252  Were the Court to fashion such a 
gerrymandered rule, officers might have the perverse incentive 
to purposefully avoid that specific violation but few others.  
―While Bivens . . . enables pecuniary damages suits to be 
brought against federal officials for their alleged 
unconstitutional acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 enables the same to be 
brought against state officials.‖253  The Supreme Court‘s 
qualified immunity jurisprudence does not clear out the 
―tension between the Court‘s objective that constitutional tort 
cases be terminated at an early stage of litigation and the 
‗inherently fact-based nature of the reasonableness inquiry 
that lies at the heart of the qualified immunity‘s analytical 
framework.‘‖254 
Qualified immunity, as it stands now, is available to 
federal and state officials commissioned with discretionary 
functions in cases where their conduct did not violate ―clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights.‖255  As this logic 
goes, these officials had no forewarning that what they were 
doing to the individual skated close to a constitutional 
limitation or even went beyond it.256  The Mitchell Court 
refused to grant absolute immunity to cabinet officials, 
deciding that ―the considerations of separation of powers that 
call for absolute immunity for state and federal legislators and 
for the President of the United States do not demand a similar 
immunity for Cabinet officers or other high executive 
 
251. 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987). 
252. 536 U.S. 730, 746 (2002). 
253. Dasgupta, supra note 233, 409-10. 
254. Id. at 410 (quoting Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified 
Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 230-31 (2006)).  See Flatford v. City of Monroe, 
17 F.3d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1994) (―[T]he difficulty for all judges with qualified 
immunity has not been articulation of the rule, but rather the application of 
it.‖); Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments 
in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447-48 
(2000). 
255. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  See also Procunier 
v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (requiring a ―clearly established‖ 
constitutional right to defeat the qualified immunity defense). 
256. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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officials.‖257  Even if the plaintiff‘s rights were violated under 
clearly established law, there remains a not-very-remote 
possibility that the officer might still receive qualified 
immunity.  The Supreme Court has been developing this aspect 
of the qualified immunity doctrine for the past three decades 
and it does not yet appear that the Court has completed its 
project. 
In 1982, for instance, the Court dramatically supplanted 
the ―malice‖ standard (the government actor‘s state of mind 
while violating the constitutional rights) with the ―reasonable 
person‖ test (assessing whether a reasonable officer would have 
understood her conduct to be a constitutional violation, as the 
law stood).258  The Saucier Court asked if ―it would be clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted.‖259  Other than the most obvious cases, 
there is great room for subjectivity here: Who is a ―reasonable‖ 
officer?  What are the elements of the ―clearly established‖ 
state of the law?  Must that ―reasonable‖ government actor 
have revealed her prior knowledge on the subject?  If that is 
the standard we apply, then would officers be constrained to 
avoid certifications or promotions lest they reveal too much 
awareness of complex subject matters that could later deprive 
them of qualified immunity?260 
This ―reasonableness‖ does not depend on ―what a lawyer 
 
257. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985). 
258. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.  See also Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. 
Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified Immunity: Reasonably 
Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of 
Subjective Intent that Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 869, 881-88 (1998); Newman, supra note 233, at 460 (―Surely [an] officer 
could not reasonably believe that there was probable cause for an unlawful 
arrest, for an unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a prudent 
police officer could not reasonably believe there was probable cause.‖ 
(emphasis in original)). 
259. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). 
260. The issue of racial profiling was once again brought to national 
attention when a police officer arrested Harvard University professor Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr., an African-American man, while the professor was entering 
his own home through the back door.  See Kevin Johnson, Alan Gomez, & 
Marisol Bello, Gates Arrest Reignites Debate on Race, USA TODAY, July 23, 
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-07-23-cop-
gates_N.htm (reporting that arresting officer is ―a police academy instructor 
on the dangers of racial profiling‖). 
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would learn or intuit from researching case law.‖261  In its 
place, ―the standard to measure liability has shifted from 
malice to assumption of expected prior knowledge, both of 
which are indecipherable elements of scienter, especially in 
close cases.‖262  The courts should make it crystal clear, 
however, that the defense is available for government officers 
only when none of the ―reasonable inferences,‖263 including 
those that are implied or deduced logically from prior decisions, 
suggest that a plaintiff‘s claims cannot survive the two-part 
qualified immunity test. 
Without the defendant‘s personal involvement, though, she 
cannot be held liable.  Supervisory liability is not, according to 
Iqbal, cognizable264—even though Justice Souter‘s dissenting 
opinion efficaciously pointed out that a claim would be 
actionable where government supervisors have ―actual 
knowledge of a subordinate‘s constitutional violation and 
acquiesce[ ];‖265 where they ―know about the conduct and 
facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear 
of what they might see;‖266 ―where the supervisor was grossly 
negligent;‖267 or ―where the supervisor has no actual knowledge 
of the violation but was reckless in his supervision of the 
subordinate.‖268  Justice Souter believed that the Iqbal Court 
discarded, not merely limited, the possibility of supervisory 
liability.269 
 
261. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 152 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. 
Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2001)) 
262. Dasgupta, supra note 233, at 412 (emphasis added). 
263. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 153 (quoting Johnson, 239 F.3d at 255). 
264. The Court cited cases to that effect.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Dunlop v. Munroe, 11 U.S. 242 (1812); Robertson v. 
Sichel, 127 U.S. 507 (1888)).  But the Iqbal Court neglected to note that 
judgments of policy made by those supervisors fall squarely within those 
―official duties.‖  See Robertson, 127 U.S. at 516. 
265. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
266. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Int‘l Action Ctr. v. United 
States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
267. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
268. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
269. Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) (―Lest there be any mistake, in 
these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it 
is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.  The nature of a 
supervisory liability theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under certain 
conditions, for the wrongdoing of his subordinates, and it is this very 
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B. Reviewing the Legality of the Torture Warrant 
 
The possibility of a torture warrant would only be put on 
the table if there was an extremely high probability that the 
torturee possessed valuable information and there was the risk 
of an attack of significant proportion, putting innocent lives at 
stake.  If performing an illegal search upon an individual‘s 
person is presumptively unconstitutional, then so is torture—
unless the actor is informed by a combination of probabilities 
that makes it significantly likely (at least more likely than not) 
that the torturee is in possession of information that could save 
lives and that the torturee will reveal this information under 
intense, perhaps searing, physical or mental pain. 
The deference later given to judging the constitutionality 
of a specific torture warrant is not tantamount to an abdication 
of judicial review.  Rather, it speaks to the balance that needs 
to be struck between genuinely compelling national security 
needs and the dignity of individuals, as enshrined in the 
Constitution.  Professor Dershowitz‘s torture warrant 
mechanism is not perfect but it ―brings the idea of foundational 
violence back to the surface‖ and ―seeks to admit the violence 
[while] control[ling] it with law.‖270  Dershowitz argues that the 
mechanism will pull the problem out into the sunlight and in 
fact ―reduce the use of torture to the smallest amount and 
degree possible.‖271  But torture secured by a warrant is 
superior to its alternatives on both extremes, and as a ―least 
drastic means‖ it is narrowly-tailored to suit the compelling 
societal interests and to honor the rights of torturees.  Applying 
the Model Penal Code‘s necessity defense parameters ―suggests 
that it would justify torture in the extreme situations and, 
importantly, fail to justify it in less extreme situations.‖272  The 
elements include: (i) ―[t]he harm to be averted must be 
imminent‖; (ii) ―[t]he act charged must have been done to 
prevent a significant evil‖; (iii) ―[t]here must be a causal 
relationship between the criminal conduct and the harm to be 
 
principle that the majority rejects.‖). 
270.  John T. Parry, Torture Warrants and the Rule of Law, 71 ALB. L. 
REV. 885, 904-05 (2008). 
271. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 141 (emphasis added). 
272. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 17. 
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averted‖; (iv) ―[t]here must have been no adequate alternative‖; 
and (v) ―[t]he harm caused must not have been 
disproportionate to the harm avoided.‖273 
The mechanism must be enacted by Congress and signed 
into law by the President, as opposed to achieved by the 
President‘s executive order alone.274  What Congress may 
vaguely direct the President to do, the Executive might 
transform into actions that Congress could not have envisioned 
or will not countenance.275  The most effective way to hold 
Congress accountable is to require the Legislature to pass 
those specific measures.  I appreciate that Justice Jackson‘s 
three-part test in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer276 
suggests a slightly different view.  Justice Jackson is correct 
that, with regard to immediacies that the Executive must face, 
congressional action is occasionally unnecessary.  But if the 
problem at issue lingers and Congress says nothing either way, 
as time passes the presumption initially favorable to the 
President incrementally fades away. 
There is a reason that the separation of powers was 
thought to protect the ―liberty of the person‖ in a manner such 
that the Framers initially ―did not consider a Bill of Rights 
 
273. Id. at 17-18. 
274. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (―Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to 
seek the authority [for trial by military commission] he believes necessary.  
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial 
insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation‘s ability to deal 
with danger.  To the contrary, that insistence strengthens the Nation‘s ability 
to determine — through democratic means — how best to do so.‖). 
275. One example, though controversial, is that Congress‘ Joint 
Resolution (in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force or the AUMF) 
authorized the President to ―use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed or aided‖ the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks.  
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001).  Were it drafting the measures in the first place, Congress may well 
have demanded greater oversight and different measures for actions so 
precipitous. 
276. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (―When the 
President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a 
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or 
in which its distribution is uncertain.  Therefore, congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, 
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.‖). 
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necessary.‖277  Separation of powers and the authority of 
Congress, much like the authority of the Parliament in 
common-law England, were expected to guard a citizen‘s 
liberty.  Both in English history (including the enactments of 
the Petition of Right and the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640 and 
1679) and in American history, the Legislature (Parliament or 
Congress) has been far more responsive to the preservation of 
individual rights than has the Executive.278  Courts, too, have 
the duty to protect individual rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution in the face of congressional and presidential 
overreaching.279  In the area of national security, some 
courageous tribunals and jurists have exhibited this trait.280  
The Supreme Court‘s recent Guantánamo Bay detention 
 
277. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 at 513, 515 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) & GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969)).  See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 
301 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (―The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.‖). 
278. See Dasgupta, supra note 56, at 442 (―Even though the Magna 
Carta asserted that no person would be unlawfully imprisoned, the lack of an 
enforcement provision and absence of a legal process to bridge the gap 
between the protections and their fruition exacerbated arbitrary detentions.‖ 
(citing Magna Carta, art. 39, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 17 
(Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959))).  ―No free man shall be 
taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way 
destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by the legal 
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.‖  Id. 
279. See, e.g., Barak, supra note 161, at 149 (―[M]atters of daily life 
constantly test judges‘ ability to protect democracy, but judges meet their 
supreme test in situations of war and terrorism.  The protection of every 
individual‘s human rights is a much more formidable duty in times of war 
and terrorism than in times of peace and security. . . .  As a Justice of the 
Israeli Supreme Court, how should I view my role in protecting human rights 
given this situation?  I must take human rights seriously during times of 
both peace and conflict.‖); ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE 46-47 (1968) (―It is the courts — the independent judiciary — 
which have, time and again, rebuked the legislatures and executive 
authorities when, under stress of war, emergency, or fear of Communism or 
revolution, they have sought to suppress the rights of dissenters.‖ (citing Ex 
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943))). 
280. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 664 (6th 
Cir. 1971) (noting that ―[i]t is the historic role of the Judiciary to see that in 
periods of crisis, when the challenge to constitutional freedoms is the 
greatest, the Constitution of the United States remains the supreme law of 
our land‖). 
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decisions—Rasul v. Bush,281 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,282 Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,283 and Boumediene v. Bush284—granting the 
detainees access to United States courts via statutory and 
constitutional habeas corpus uniformly reject presidential 
unilateralism where individual rights are concerned.285  
Similar to the torture scenario, here too the President‘s Office 
of Legal Counsel advised ―that the great weight of legal 
authority indicates that a district court could not properly 
exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at 
[Guantánamo Bay].‖286 
 
281. 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (exploring statutory habeas corpus applied to 
the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay). 
282. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that due process of law requires U.S. 
citizens at Guantánamo Bay be given some acceptable process to determine 
their culpability and punishment before a neutral arbiter). 
283. 548 U.S. 557, 706 (2006) (noting that the procedural and 
substantive rules governing the Guantánamo Bay military commissions lack 
the power to proceed ―because of its failures to comply with the terms of the 
UCMJ and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949‖). 
284. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that federal law denying 
Guantánamo Bay detainees the access to federal courts violates the 
Suspension Clause in Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution and that 
the substitute provided by the federal law is constitutionally inadequate). 
285. But see Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural 
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 
(1992); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative 
State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001); Christopher 
Yoo, Steven Calabresi & Anthony Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the 
Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005).  This philosophy was 
summed up by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 679 (2006). 
 
Congress, to be sure, has a substantial and essential role in 
both foreign affairs and national security.  But Congress 
cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible 
action the President may find it necessary to take or every 
possible situation in which he might act, and [s]uch failure 
of Congress . . . does not, especially in the areas of foreign 
policy and national security, imply congressional 
disapproval of action taken by the Executive. 
 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
But see Peter Irons, “The Constitution is Just a Scrap of Paper”: Empire 
versus Democracy, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1091 (2005); Gary Lawson & 
Christopher Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1996). 
286. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy 
Assistant Attorneys Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to 
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How do we evaluate if a torture warrant comports with due 
process or the Eighth Amendment?  An after-the-fact 
constitutional evaluation of a specific torture warrant involves 
all of the principles recognized in the Supreme Court‘s qualified 
immunity jurisprudence.  But the application of those 
principles must be significantly tweaked and recalibrated.  
Artificially erecting insurmountable pleading hurdles based on 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is unlikely to be 
a workable or honest solution to this complex problem.  Nor can 
we structure the officials‘ ―individual responsibility‖ in such a 
way as to let all high-level officials off the hook.  Most 
frequently, the subordinates are the ones who are executing 
the commands given from the upper echelons.  Third, and on a 
related point, we must not so unnaturally restrict the definition 
of ―official duties‖ (under Robertson v. Sichel)287 to the 
individual tasks of the officials (high or petty).  The supervisory 
duties of high-level administrators are just as ―official‖ as other 
tasks composing their portfolios. 
Inviting the ―conscious disregard of the complex role of 
facts in constitutional adjudication,‖ the Supreme Court‘s 
―clearly established law‖ test in its qualified immunity cases 
poses pragmatic and logistical problems as well.  Professor 
Alan Chen argues the ―multifactored balancing tests in 
substantive constitutional law‖ are difficult enough to apply in 
the immediate case, let alone to argue that they serve in a 
multitude of cases as a benchmark reminder of what sort of 
conduct is constitutionally permissible.288  Still, a principled-
line must be drawn between judicial restraint and 
abandonment in order to continue enforcing liability (direct or 
some form of vicarious) in cases where government actors 
violate constitutional rights. 
Obviously, as supervisory liability becomes more vicarious, 
the qualified immunity defense grows stronger and a plaintiff‘s 
chance of recovering money damages becomes weaker.  In his 
Iqbal dissent, Justice Breyer mentioned that ―a trial court, 
 
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep‘t. of Def. on Possible Habeas 
Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001), 
available at http://texscience.org/reform/torture/philbin-yoo-habeas-28dec 
01.pdf. 
287. 127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888). 
288. Chen, supra note 254, at 230. 
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responsible for managing a case and ‗mindful of the need to 
vindicate the purpose of the qualified immunity defense,‘ can 
structure discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing 
unwarranted burdens upon public officials.‖289  The court may 
―begin discovery with lower level government defendants before 
determining whether a case can be made to allow discovery 
related to higher level government officials.‖290  This approach 
would weed out meritless cases against higher-level officials, 
and is in line with the fact that ―[t]he law, after all, provides 
trial courts with other legal weapons designed to prevent 
unwarranted interference.‖291  The Iqbal Court expressly noted 
a desire to disincentivize the discovery stages for high officials 
with demanding functions.  Justice Souter‘s dissent similarly 
explained that the Court‘s failure to see the various degrees 
and shades of supervisory liability in Bivens actions led to the 
mistaken binary belief that there could either be complete 
supervisory liability or none whatsoever.292  The Court chose 
the latter path. 
Furthermore, the torture warrant procedure must take 
care to honor the ―deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone 
should have his own day in court.‖293  This means more than 
just that persons should not be barred from challenging their 
torture by suspended habeas or lack of federal jurisdiction in 
those cases.  Federal jurisdiction is not conferred by 
congressional enactments such as the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 (DTA)294 or the Military Commissions Act (MCA);295 
 
289. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961 (2009) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
290. Id. at 1961-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
291. Id. at 1961 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
292. Id. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting) (―Even if an employer is not 
liable for the actions of his employee solely because the employee was acting 
within the scope of employment, there still might be conditions to render a 
supervisor liable for the conduct of his subordinate.‖). 
293. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008) (quoting Richards v. 
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)) (acknowledging that the federal 
common law of preclusion is governed by constitutional due process 
restrictions). 
294. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 
2680 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006), and 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(d)).  Section 1005(e) of the DTA amended the erstwhile federal 
habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241) to provide that ―no court, justice, or 
judge shall have jurisdiction to . . .  consider . . . an application for . . . habeas 
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained . . . at Guantánamo.‖  The 
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these statutes had a preclusive effect on federal court 
jurisdiction over habeas claims from Guantánamo.  The 
Government must take special care to ensure that legal 
services, including attorneys and expedited procedures, are 
extended to those challenging their torture.  Observance of 
these strictures is essential, but not necessarily sufficient, to 
satisfy the substance of the strict scrutiny test.  The two 
benchmarks of that test, a compelling societal interest and 
narrow tailoring, are situation-specific and may authorize 
torture only in limited circumstances. 
Despite the ―absolute ban‖ on torture currently in place, 
that patchwork jurisprudence is fraught with government-
approved exceptions (many of which are clandestine).296  Such a 
façade of a rhetorical absolute ban clearly contravenes the rule 
of law because it obfuscates the truth and provides 
misinformation to the electorate.  It also ―encourages 
inappropriate torture by preventing proper assessment of the 
appropriateness of torture‘s quantity and quality.‖297  
Moreover, this regime makes no room for regulated torture 
that could be authorized by a United States Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) tribunal,298 which would 
 
amended version has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
295.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-50 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006); and 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(c)-(e) (2006)). 
296. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 22, at 1484.  See also Raviv, supra note 
32, at 149 (―A number of the countries that have signed on to these 
conventions, including Great Britain and Israel, have quite plainly engaged 
in activities that violate the conventions, indicating that at least some 
officials in these countries think that torture can be an effective means of 
extracting desired information.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
297. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 4. 
298. The FISC is a United States federal court (but not an Article III 
court) authorized by 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (or the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978).  This court oversees requests for 
surveillance warrants from Federal Government police agencies, such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, against suspected foreign intelligence 
agents.  Recently the FISC has been embroiled in several privacy-related 
controversies related to (1) allegations that its warrants exceeded the 
commission Congress gave the court, or (2) that government officials 
circumvented the court altogether.  See Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, 
Spy Court Judge Quits in Protest: Jurist Concerned Bush Order Tainted Work 
of Secret Panel, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A01; Dan Eggen & Susan 
Schmidt, Secret Court Rebuffs Ashcroft. Justice Dept. Chided On 
Misinformation, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2002, at A01. 
70http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19
614 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
have an immediate, time-sensitive perspective and sufficient 
judicial independence to refuse a government request.  The 
arguments supporting transparency would most likely not be 
undermined if Congress were to exclude ordinary Article III 
federal district courts from acting as Torture Warrant 
Tribunals.  But, certainly, an adequate substitute and a strong 
appellate process are necessary—one candidate has been the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the 
traditional forum for administrative and constitutional law). 
As a result of the Supreme Court‘s qualified immunity 
jurisprudence, the threshold for relief in cases against 
government officials who committed torture in the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001 has been significantly raised.  Indeed, it 
has been raised so high that it is now extremely difficult for a 
torturee to obtain pecuniary relief.299  Part of the reason for 
this trend is that courts are unwilling to second-guess Congress 
or the President on national security issues due to the 
institutional competence of the latter branches; another part of 
the reason is that courts believe that the responsibility to 
conduct national security affairs sweeps so broadly as to eclipse 
individual rights in many situations;300 and certainly part of 
the reason is that qualified immunity must be so controlled 
that only the most heinous conduct is punished.  That said, 
what the Court might understand or apply as a ―heinous‖ 
standard is also not quite clear.  Does it mean something along 
the lines of genocide or crimes against humanity?  Or can it be 
closer to a search-and-frisk Fourth Amendment violation?  
Where does torture fall between these two extremes? 
These musings are not impractical or unlikely to arise.  
Bivens-like cases do not allow courts to make those 
determinations of their own initiative; rather the limited role of 
the judiciary is to determine whether there was a 
constitutional violation forbidden by Bivens and whether, 
under Rule 8, the plaintiffs have provided enough evidence to 
 
299. Of course, by way of distinguishing future cases, one might argue 
that the tragedy of September 11 justified measures that will not be justified 
by future instances of torture. 
300. See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in 
the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 441 (2002); Neal K. 
Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the 
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Jules Lobel, The War On 
Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767 (2002). 
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state a prima facie case.  Preferring one set of violations over 
another would be judicial law-making in the quintessential 
sense.  And while it is true that ―[w]hen the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, 
his authority is at its maximum,‖ it does not mean that the 
exercise of power is automatically constitutional.301  The degree 
of this ―implied authorization‖ weighs heavily.  For instance, if 
Congress passed legislation in the year 2015 providing that 
―The President shall have the power to take care that the 
Army‘s practices and drills are helpful and successful,‖ it would 
not override a 2005 law that specifically described the 
protections that a certain species of animals enjoyed—even if 
the Army, at the President‘s direction, found it easier to 
practice in a manner that harmed that protected species.  The 
degree and specificity of the regulations as well as the possible, 
less drastic alternatives figure into the analysis.  Only if an 
effort to reconcile the two statutes fails do we entertain the 
possibility that one might supersede the other.  And we should 
not cavalierly assume that Congress is always constitutionally 
capable of transferring its prerogative to the President. 
In all of those cases, the Court must be sufficiently sincere 
and candid, spelling out what the standard is and avoiding 
running away with the goal-post as soon as the plaintiffs reach 
the goal.  In most cases, injunctive relief is out of the question 
(after the torture has already been committed).  And most 
officials do not face disciplinary or other legal consequences for 
their actions.  There is cause to believe, according to the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, Sir Nigel Rodley, that ―impunity continues to be the 
principal cause of the perpetuation of human rights violations, 
and particularly of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
 
301. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring).  See id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (―When 
the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a 
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or 
in which its distribution is uncertain. . . .  When the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only 
by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.‖). 
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executions.‖302  These reasons (in tandem with the fact that 
torture may never be fully eliminated) require that the torture 
dilemma be brought out into the open.  Such transparency and 
discussion might help prevent procedural defaults from 
impeding substantive justice.303  Foucault, earlier referenced in 
Part I, would have said the same: there might be real benefits 
in exposing the torture equation (the risks, the probabilities, 
and the frequencies of occurrence), without specific details and 




We return to Square One: the morality, the effectiveness, 
and the dangers of torture.  By and large, utilitarian thinking 
pervades governments‘ approach to torture.  It is true that 
rule-absolutists, whether theoretically or empirically, maintain 
that torture constitutes an invasion of the physical and mental 
sanctity of the human person and must remain categorically 
precluded—whatever the consequences.  Rule-
consequentialists, on the other hand, believe in the same 
bottom-line result but they reason differently.  An absolute ban 
on torture, in many cases, leads to a better result than does 
tinkering with it and poking holes.  Unreliability and the 
possibility of mistakes also inform this calculus; an absolute 
ban on torture is, for pragmatic reasons, superior.  An obvious 
criticism leveled at the absolute ban against torture is that in 
attempting to prevent the pain or even death of one individual, 
authorities might give way to the pain of many more innocents.  
Of course, there is a difference between government action and 
private action.  Justice Stevens characterized this sort of 
argument as ―a classic non sequitur.‖304 
At the very least, however, this means there are some 
restraints on what the government can do—mainly with 
 
302. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM‘R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET 
NO.11 (REV.1), EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet11Rev.1en.pdf. 
303. See, e.g., Johnson v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 
48, 62 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (―Procedure is the means; full, 
equal and exact enforcement of substantive law is the end.‖ (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
304. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 859 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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reference to conditions, duration, and degree.  It establishes a 
compelling government interest and does not mean the 
government is entirely powerless to act.  The counterpoint is 
that utilitarianism lacks safeguards, and torture is one such 
absolute limitation that forbids society‘s and the legal system‘s 
descent into madness.  Similar to a proportionality analysis 
which balances the need to punish with the risk or culpability 
at stake, a theoretical slide down from an aboslute ban on 
torture will also open us up to a cost-benefit analysis.  The 
hazard of such an analysis is that it is subjective and 
discretionary (thus capable of arbitrariness) and susceptible of 
leading to too much torture.  Additionally, a higher moral 
standard, it has been argued, enables the United States to 
remain a standard bearer of human dignity in the world.  An 
absolute, immutable commitment against torture is 
indispensable to maintaining that high ground.  These 
questions are difficult, and even an absolute result should not 
come without sufficient deliberation.  In continuing that 
thinking, we must remember that 
 
―[s]ecurity considerations‖ are not magic words.  
The court must insist on learning the specific 
security considerations that prompted the 
government‘s actions.  The court must also be 
persuaded that these considerations actually 
motivated the government‘s actions and were not 
merely pretextual.  Finally, the court must be 
convinced that the security measures adopted 
were the available measures least damaging to 
human rights.305 
 
 The intersection and overlapping of due process and the 
Eighth Amendment reveal some of the moral concerns as well, 
but the decision is also at the Nation‘s public-policy doorstep.  
A decision by the People to ban or limit torture (as punishment 
and as interrogation)—and to mean it—may end the 
constitutional debate.  Until then, the discourse should 
continue robustly.  The destiny of constitutional republics is 
such that it gives them a mandate to ensure security but also 
 
305. Barak, supra note 161, at 157-58. 
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the requirement that individual liberties should not be 
compromised.  The imposition of torture raises solemn 
questions about the violation of another‘s person and the 
integrity of their being, even in time-sensitive situations with 
innocent lives at stake.  However we come out on the ultimate 
constitutional question, and our decision will most likely be 
case-specific, the moral and philosophical questions will keep 
gnawing at the heart of society‘s self-definition.  Sophisticated 
mechanisms such as torture warrants may well detour the core 
debate, but, sooner or later, the main question will arrive at 
the judicial gate.  Courts should answer the questions 
incrementally, not only with respect for judicial humility but 
also due to the fact that a sweeping answer too quickly given 
might prove deleterious to future cases.306 
Moreover, societies need time and space to reason 
themselves through changed circumstances and contexts.  The 
torture issue needs such space and public input so that the 
judicial decision is informed by, rather than preemptive of, 
society‘s contemporary understanding.307  A constitutional 
 
306. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (―[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order 
to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the 
Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court 
for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal 
procedure and of transplanting American citizens.  The principle then lies 
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring 
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. . . .  A military commander may 
overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  But if we 
review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the 
Constitution.  There it has a generative power of its own . . . .‖); Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000) (―No court laying down a general rule 
can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to 
apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much 
a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.‖). 
307. See Dist. Attorney‘s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 
129 S. Ct. 2308, 2341 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (―Changes in societal 
understanding of the fundamental reasonableness of government actions 
work out in much the same way that individuals reconsider issues of 
fundamental belief.  We can change our own inherited views just so fast, and 
a person is not labeled a stick-in-the-mud for refusing to endorse a new moral 
claim without having some time to work through it intellectually and 
emotionally.  Just as attachment to the familiar and the limits of experience 
affect the capacity of an individual to see the potential legitimacy of a moral 
position, the broader society needs the chance to take part in the dialectic of 
public and political back and forth about a new liberty claim before it makes 
sense to declare unsympathetic state or national laws arbitrary to the point 
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court in a democracy, certainly one of last resort, appreciates as 
much. 
 
of being unconstitutional.‖). 
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